In his balanced, and thus all the more disturbing, history of the CIA, Tim Weiner tells how an agency intended to inform the President about the world became so mired in cloak and dagger politics that the US now lacks the intelligence it needs to operate effectively on the world stage.
Why is it that the agency intended to provide us with intelligence about the world became a tool to shape our perception of that world for political purposes?
Why, for decades, did the agency acquire a shining reputation despite misreading nearly every global crisis?
How did the CIA misread Castro's Cuba, chances of victory in Vietnam, and the Soviet Union's staying power?
Mr. Weiner argues that these C.I.A. missteps have encouraged many of our gravest contemporary problems: Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, and terrorism- World Affairs Council of Oregon
Tim Weiner is a reporter for The New York Times. He has written on American intelligence for twenty years, and won the Pulitzer Prize for his work on secret national security programs. He has traveled to Afghanistan and other nations to investigate CIA covert operations firsthand.
Tim Weiner explains how, after Watergate, Gerald Ford and Donald Rumsfeld chose George H. W. Bush to run the CIA. Weiner claims Bush did a competent job, but Rumsfeld exhibited some telling behavior as Secretary of Defense while in charge of the intelligence budget.
Principal intelligence and counterintelligence agency of the U.S., established in 1947 as a successor to the World War II-era Office of Strategic Services. The law limits its activities to foreign countries; it is prohibited from gathering intelligence on U.S. soil, which is a responsibility of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Officially a part of the U.S. Defense Department, it is responsible for preparing analyses for the National Security Council. Its budget is kept secret. Though intelligence gathering is its chief occupation, the CIA has also been involved in many covert operations, including the expulsion of Mohammad Mosaddeq from Iran (1953), the attempted Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba (1961), and support of the Nicaraguan contras in the 1980s.
This was an outstanding presentation, and I believe if members of the intel community watched this they would fully understand that Mr. Weiner's aims of The Legacy of Ashes has been to critique and express a hope for a better and stronger intelligence service and community. As opposed to ad hominem attack the agency for its failures. I was very impressed by this lecture, and this should be linked from the CIA's History Office own response to duly defend the Agency.
The book and discussion enhances our understanding of the IC.
I had a nigthmare that in the second war ther wer spis that trabeld tru time bi going into the men or weman will they wer awaik to listen to conbersations and wen they wer looking at documenturis of the war in the 1940's and wen they use the information to conter any intervation in the past that help the British and french and the peaple that wer traspased actualy heped the Nazi armys wit out remors, then I aweican again