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Good morning, everyone. IÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â€žÂ¢m Jessica Mathews, president of the Carnegie Endowment. ItÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â€žÂ¢s a great pleasure to welcome Commissioner Peter Mandelson to Carnegie this morning and to welcome all of you as well. In a moment, weÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â€žÂ¢re going to hear a wide-ranging speech, which I am very much looking forward to. I want to just take a minute to introduce Commissioner Mandelson and put this in some context. As everyone knows, I think, he has been EU Commissioner since 2004, began his career as an economist at the Trades Union Congress and then worked also as a television journalist and in political campaign work as director of Tony BlairÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â€žÂ¢s 1997 campaign that brought the Labour Party to power, served in Parliament for 12 years, and also in the cabinet as secretary of state for trade and industry, where he oversaw the institution of the first national minimum wage. And as secretary of state for Northern Ireland, he likes easy problems. He has also had a wide-ranging career that has included ÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â‚¬Å“ in U.S. terms ÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â‚¬Å“ legislative, executive, media, just about every angle from which you can ÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â‚¬Å“ and now international, multinational ÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â‚¬Å“ from which you can approach a problem. And heÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â€žÂ¢s needed all of that in his current position, because as you know, almost from the day the Doha round began, it has been a struggle to keep it moving forward. Its creation coincided with the seismic events of both 9/11 and the accession of China to the WTO. But more so since then, with a trend almost before our eyes, a global redistribution of economic power with not just the astonishing growth of China, but the emergence of India, Brazil, South Africa, and others as important economic players. So while the launch of the Doha Round as a development round was greeted with a certain skepticism about the seriousness of that commitment, reality has brought it to the fore as the developing countries themselves have formed negotiating blocks and made it clear that they will not agree to a settlement unless it takes as much account of their interests as it does of the U.S. and EU. So it has been an enormous challenge, particularly because the United States has been ÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â‚¬Å“ shall we say ÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â‚¬Å“ a bit distracted through this period, and has also tended to see the trade issues very much in a U.S.-China bilateral context, sometimes to the detriment of the broader negotiation. For us at Carnegie, itÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â€žÂ¢s a particular pleasure to have Commissioner Mandelson here because we too have been struck by the immense change in the world and the need, in our view, to adapt to it. Our change has taken the form of realizing that with everything else in the world globalizing ÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â‚¬Å“ business, entertainment, education, industry, religion ÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â‚¬Å“ it is somewhat odd, to say the least, that think tanks of all things have tended to stay very national. So a couple of years ago, we launched ourselves in an effort to try to become the first global think with a first phase whose results you see up here, research centers in Moscow, Beirut, Beijing, and offices as well in the two centers of world governance in Washington and Brussels. So for us to hear Commissioner MandelsonÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â€žÂ¢s thoughts, both on the trade issues but the broader agenda that includes China, foreign investment, the sovereign wealth funds, and others that he is going to talk to us about, this feels very right for us. So itÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â€žÂ¢s a great pleasure to have you here, and we look forward, both to your remarks and to the discussion with all of you that will follow. Well, Jessica, ladies and gentlemen, thank you very much indeed for that introduction. As I struggle manfully day-to-day with the problems of the WTO talks itÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â€žÂ¢s good for me to remember that I have actually faced even more intractable challenges in my professional past in implementing the peace settlement in Northern Ireland. Although, you know, to be perfectly frank, I think the problems I have in the Doha round make Northern Ireland look like a sort of walk in the park. Anyway, letÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â€žÂ¢s not dwell on that. This is sort of Europe week in Washington. President Sarkozy was in town yesterday presenting France; not only as AmericaÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â€žÂ¢s oldest ally, but its newest ally. (Laughter.) This is very welcome, of course. I mean, as far as Europe as a whole is concerned, weÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â€žÂ¢re not just the oldest, but weÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â€žÂ¢re also the best allies that the United States has had. And at the end of the week, Chancellor Merkel, the chancellor of Germany is either coming into town or riding into the farm in Crawford. IÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â€žÂ¢m not sure which sheÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â€žÂ¢s doing, both or either. So between Sarkozy and Merkel, IÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â€žÂ¢m the sort of meat in the sandwich for you. And I hope itÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â€žÂ¢s going to be sort of nourishing meat rather than sort of chewy and indigestible meat in what I have to say this morning. But IÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â€žÂ¢m really pleased and I feel quite privileged to have been asked by the Endowment to speak to you about global challenges today. IÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â€žÂ¢m pleased to do so ahead of the discussions that are the sort of formal reason that I am here in Washington, the formal discussions that weÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â€žÂ¢re going to have tomorrow, which will focus on the current workings and future potential of the transatlantic marketplace. Now, the transatlantic economy is not only the bedrock of the whole of the global economy, it is almost ÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â‚¬Å“ not quite, but almost ÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â‚¬Å“ tariff-free, especially for manufacturers. And this is increasingly true for actually all the developed economies. So the agenda that preoccupies us is less about tariffs than about non-tariff barriers to trade and investment, things like product specifications and accountancy standards, which you may or may not be relieved to hear IÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â€žÂ¢m not going to dwell on at great length this morning. But this is the sort of detailed but vital work that will increasingly dominate the EU-U.S. trade agenda in the years ahead. Now, tomorrow morning, the new Transatlantic Economic Council holds its first working meeting. And this council, as you may know, was the brainchild of the German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, who championed its creation when Germany was the presidency of the European Union earlier this year. And this council will provide a forum for EU and U.S. senior policymakers to conduct strategic discussions of economic issues, which in my view meets a very important political need. But it will also direct a detailed work program designed to tackle the important non-tariff barriers that still exist in EU-U.S. trade, including, for the first time, a serious dialogue on investment rules. I think that by combining the big picture with technical detail, the Transatlantic Economic Council is an important new instrument in the EU-U.S. relationship, designed to tackle future problems between what are already highly open and developed economies. ItÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â€žÂ¢s a practical response, in other words, to the issues that matter to businesses in Europe and the U.S. and weÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â€žÂ¢re determined that it wonÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â€žÂ¢t just be a talk shop, although it will be that no doubt, but that it will also be a talk shop that delivers change and results. What I want to do today, Jessica, is not to look at the detailed work program of the Transatlantic Economic Council. But I want to put the work of this council in a wider context. I want to argue that this council can and should be a major forum where the EU and the U.S. set out our joint approaches to a world in which the economic and political order is changing very fast indeed. The EU and the U.S. account for almost a billion of the worldÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â€žÂ¢s people, and the bulk of its wealth. While I donÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â€žÂ¢t believe that we can any longer dictate the global agenda ÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â‚¬Å“ nor should we attempt to do so ÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â‚¬Å“ we nevertheless between us still have the predominant collective weight and influence and responsibility to shape that global agenda, and to shape the answers that humankind is seeking to the shared problems that we all face on our planet. Now, the question I want to answer today is, how do we do this and to what purpose? Firstly, fundamentally, we must engage with economic globalization, accept it, shape it. WeÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â€žÂ¢re not going to roll it back, and if we could, we shouldnÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â€žÂ¢t seek to do so. In fact, IÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â€žÂ¢d argue that the preservation of an equitable economic globalization should be the core political commitment at the heart of the transatlantic economic relationship, equivalent in its way to the mutual commitment to democracy that the Atlantic Charter embodied six decades ago, because managed right, an economically integrated world is ultimately not only a more stable and a more equitable world; it is also our principal means of meeting the increasing number of global challenges that require collective action. The reshaping of the global economy and the huge dramatic changes that are taking place in the economic landscape of the world certainly test the nerves of us in Europe and the nerves of you too in the United States. But just because it tests our nerves doesnÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â€žÂ¢t mean to say that these changes are not in our interests. ItÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â€žÂ¢s true that some parts of our manufacturing sectors are certainly facing some tough competitive pressure. It is true that this will force us to think about how we choose to educate and to train ourselves in the future, and how we ensure that the benefits of economic growth are equitably shared. ThatÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â€žÂ¢s a major policy challenge for us on both sides of the Atlantic. It is true that because of these great changes and the huge anxiety that they are generating amongst people on both sides of the Atlantic that policymakers are under increasing pressure to show that our embrace of economic globalization is not naivety, that weÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â€žÂ¢re not being taken for a ride, in other words, by the rest of the world; to show that ÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â‚¬Å“ as we need to do as policymakers ÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â‚¬Å“ to show that closing the gate to the outside world is not a better alternative to keeping that gate open to the rest of the world. Now, these debates are broadly the same in Europe and the United States. But in an open global market, we have to understand that the growing economies of the developing world are also a competitive stimulus and a real engine for the growth of our own economies. They are a market for our goods and for our investment. They are a source of downward pressure on consumer prices and inflation at home. They are also the driving force that has lifted perhaps half a billion people out of poverty in half a human lifetime, which is hard to argue against. In defending and preserving this openness to the world and this growth of the global economy and its integration, the EU and the U.S. are faced with some simple realities. The first is that we now live in a world that is increasingly economically multi-polar. One billion new workers have entered the global labor force in the space of just two decades in the world. In those 20-odd years, China has risen from a country with which the EU traded almost literally nothing to becoming our biggest trading partner for manufacturers. In some ways, an older balance of economic power is reasserting itself in the world. In 1830, India and China were the two biggest economies in the world ÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â‚¬Å“ in 1830. By 2050, they will again be amongst the very largest economies in the world. Of course, this is not the only way of weighing power in the modern world, far from it. But it is fundamental. And thatÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â€žÂ¢s in the nature of the fundamental revolution in economic terms, and also political terms, therefore, that the world is undergoing. Now, the machinery of what you might call the Atlantic consensus ÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â‚¬Å“ the World Bank, the IMF, GATT, G7 or G8 ÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â‚¬Å“ was conceived and rooted in the assumption that the global economic and political order could and would indeed be governed largely by the Atlantic world. That assumption now no longer holds. There has been a reorientation from the Atlantic to the Pacific and beyond. Now, the multilateral institutions that survive, therefore, will be those ones that are able to adapt to this new 21st century landscape. The second simple reality that I would identify for you is that economic globalization means interdependence. This is not simply a question of global supply chains an production lines. Our open markets are a ladder out of poverty for the developing world. Their growing markets are a source of growth for us. That is the fundamental interdependence that links and joins us and our interests together in the global economy. world of growing prosperity and economic integration is a more stable world, even if it doesnÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â€žÂ¢t always feel that way Now, for that reason, multilateral institutions in the multilateral trading system will matter more than ever in the new global age of the 21st century. There is no going it alone in this century, in this global age. Interdependence doesnÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â€žÂ¢t allow going it alone in the way that we have tried to practice or imagine it was possible in the past. Our ability to get things done multilaterally will define the extent to which we can shape globalization in a way that makes it equitable and sustainable and binds in the big new players who are emerging in that global economy. It will certainly define the extent to which we can confront huge pressing problems such as global warming, migration, nuclear proliferation, and energy security. You look at any of those issues, issues and challenges, which touch us personally and intimately in our societies and our communities where we live, they all have their roots and their origins in global challenges and global issues. Never was it less the case that politics is local. Politics is global and we have to recognize that and understand that the only way in which weÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â€žÂ¢re going to come to terms with and allow our politics to gestate in a more hopeful and positive direction is by using more and better multilateral processes and institutions, in order to use our collective weight and influence and strength in order to bring about the changes, the improvements and changes that we want to see in the world that will benefit all. So an Atlantic economic charter, today, I think would read like this. Promote open global markets as a source of development and opportunity for our businesses and our jobs and everyone elseÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â€žÂ¢s. Resist protectionism at home. Work for a positive reciprocity that creates openness in all markets abroad. Welcome the big, new players. Welcome, embrace the big, new players, and ensure that they have a stake in a rules-based, multilateral trading system. Defend the rules of that system and use effective trade defense measures when people break those rules. Which brings me to China ÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â‚¬Å“ I think that the most significant, symbolic, emblematic test of such an approach as IÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â€žÂ¢ve described in a putative Atlantic economic charter, the test for Europe and the United States, more than any other, will be China ÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â‚¬Å“ which we will be discussing, incidentally, during the Transatlantic Economic Council tomorrow. The number that preoccupies me these days is $20 million, $20 million, because that is how fast the EU- China trade deficit is growing every single hour; not week, not day, hour. $20 million is what sort of preoccupies my little trade commissionerÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â€žÂ¢s would be computer-like brain. Now, that is fast enough to catch up with the U.S.-China trade deficit in the next year or so. I mean, you may think that youÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â€žÂ¢re winning this race ÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â‚¬Å“ (laughter) ÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â‚¬Å“ but weÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â€žÂ¢re right up there behind you. Two weeks ago, China overtook Germany to become the biggest national exporter in the global economy; China, which not so long ago, barely featured on our radars and was a subject we hardly addressed. ItÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â€žÂ¢s now a bigger exporter than Germany, which hitherto has been the biggest in the world. China has become such a difficult issue in our politics that it is important, though, and I want to stress this to you at the outset, itÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â€žÂ¢s important to stop and recall the basic fact that openness to ChinaÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â€žÂ¢s growing economy is, in general, a good thing for us, both in the U.S. and the EU, to break on inflation, a competitive check, and a huge market for our goods and services. ThatÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â€žÂ¢s why I say unequivocally, ChinaÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â€žÂ¢s growth is, in principle, a good thing for us. A change on the scale of ChinaÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â€žÂ¢s impact on the world economy, obviously though, can never be easy to accommodate. But it is in our interest, as much as ChinaÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â€žÂ¢s, to have China at the table in the WTO system, playing by the rules as a major global economic power. We have a joint interest in a China policy that recognizes the long-term economic and systemic interests that we jointly share. So our first message to China must, in my view, be one of recognition and acceptance. Even some of the main points of contention with China are actually rooted in shared interests. We want an end to a managed currency in China thatÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â€žÂ¢s hurting us. But a stronger yuan would also stabilize the Chinese economy by boosting domestic demand and removing some of their massive dependence on export-led growth. Even if revaluation would not, in itself, solve our trade deficits ÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â‚¬Å“ and by the way, it wouldnÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â€žÂ¢t ÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â‚¬Å“ it would help cool an overheating, heavy industry sector, which is swollen with overcapacity in China and artificially cheap capital, boost domestic demand, and create a better social safety net in China. And you reduce the huge levels of precautionary saving that are padding the Chinese banking sector and removing the need for change and reform within the Chinese economic system. But the corollary of the acceptance of ChinaÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â€žÂ¢s new global status ÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â‚¬Å“ and I stress this with equal force and emphasis ÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â‚¬Å“ must be acceptance by China that we are going to deal with her as we would any other major trading power. We will deal with China as we would with each other. We have our legitimate complaints about Chinese practices and we should press them. We want China to fulfill its remaining WTO obligations and to trade fairly with the rest of the world. We need China to reciprocate the market access on which its own growth is built. We have a joint interest in seeing the protection of intellectual property rights dramatically improved in China. Now, China has been perhaps the single greatest beneficiary of a rules-based open trade system in the last decade. Now, China must live by those same rules. She cannot expect special considerations and special allowances. I think this is the only way that we will be able to sustain the political support at home that we need in our own societies to meet the challenges and changes that an open economic relationship with China imposes on us. If we donÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â€žÂ¢t get that reciprocity from China, I donÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â€žÂ¢t believe it will be possible, certainly not in the way that we have to date. And my word, itÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â€žÂ¢s been hard to sustain public support for our openness to China. And thatÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â€žÂ¢s why I say itÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â€žÂ¢s in ChinaÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â€žÂ¢s own interests, if it doesnÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â€žÂ¢t want to provoke a backlash here or in Europe against its exports, its mighty export-led growth, China has got to play fair with the rest of the world. Everyone has got to understand that these rules are not being operated simply in ChinaÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â€žÂ¢s interests, but they are being operated fairly, on an even playing field in all of our interests in the global economy. Now, we need to find a similar balance on the question of foreign investment, especially the operation of sovereign wealth funds. As anyone knows well who followed the Dubai ports issue last year or the question of RussiaÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â€žÂ¢s Gazprom downstream investments in Europe, this is an area that is highly sensitive and easily politicized. It would be a fundamental mistake to encourage the public perception that foreign investment in our economies is, in essence, a bad thing, even when the shareholders are foreign governments. I donÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â€žÂ¢t think we should present that investment as, in essence, a bad thing not least because the EU and the U.S. are the biggest exporters of foreign direct investment in the global economy and some half a trillion dollars of our own investments in 2006 depended on the argument that such capital movements across borders pose no threat. So be careful about changing the argument because it can boomerang against us. Over the last two decades, EU investment alone has created far more jobs in the United States economy than the U.S. has lost to China. We have nothing, therefore, to gain from a protectionist turn in global investment markets. Our own policy must set a global example Now, I believe the issue of sovereign wealth funds ÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â‚¬Å“ these vast funds that are being built up on the back of huge energy receipts in the main, but not only in the Gulf, in Russia, in North Africa, in the case of Algeria, potentially, and Libya ÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â‚¬Å“ I think the issue for these sovereign wealth funds, which are becoming very major factors and players in world capital markets, is essentially one of transparency and the need to determine what is genuinely strategic and what domestic ownership is genuinely in need of protection within our economies. I believe there is a place for oversight of sovereign investment in the genuinely strategic parts of our economies although determining which sectors those might be, genuinely strategic, is a hard enough thing to do. I think there are irrefutable arguments for full disclosure of asset ownership by these state funds. And I think that we can legitimately expect those who want to invest in our economies through these sovereign wealth funds to reciprocate by giving access to our capital in their own markets. And that is where I think the rub, thatÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â€žÂ¢s where the tension and the dispute, is going to come. If we remain open to you and we donÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â€žÂ¢t bar the investment from your sovereign funds, then you have to be open to us and to our investment on genuinely free and open terms. Not we come and invest and establish our businesses on your terms and then for you simply to spit us out when you donÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â€žÂ¢t like us any longer; that isnÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â€žÂ¢t WTO-compatible, but on genuinely fair, consistent, and open terms. Now, what we need, therefore, is a set of principles agreed internationally, a sort of code of conduct for investors and recipients of investment that will establish the ground rules for the global investment of sovereign wealth. Here, again, Europe and the U.S. have a major interest in working together and with others. Now, itÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â€žÂ¢s impossible to talk about the EU and the U.S. underwriting an open, global economy without touching on the WTO Doha round. DohaÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â€žÂ¢s success would not only create substantial new trade; it would lock in the openness created in the global economy by unilateral liberalization that has taken place over the last 10 years since the Uruguay round, especially in the emerging economies. Perhaps most importantly, given DohaÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â€žÂ¢s development ambitions, it would send a powerful signal that the United States and the European Union are willing, fundamentally, to reform the support given to their farm sectors so that it does not harm, any longer, developing countries in the way that it has damaged their trading capacity and prospects in the past. And assuming that they, too, want to play fair in this round, it would bring the large, emerging economies firmly into the multilateral trading system, with industrial tariff cuts and service-sector openings of their own that genuinely reflect their growing strength in the international trading system and indeed, their own benefits and the gains they stand to make from progressive openness and liberalization of their own economies. For after six years, there is more or less a deal, a Doha deal, on the table. It is substantial and it is valuable. For European export industries, it is valuable. For American goods and service producers and for American farmers, itÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â€žÂ¢s valuable. For Brazilian ranchers, itÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â€žÂ¢s valuable. For Indian service providers, for the economic development, indeed, of the poorest countries, notably those in Africa, as long as the outcome is on the right terms that meet AfricaÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â€žÂ¢s needs, the Doha deal on the table is worth a great deal. It is not ideal for anyone, and less, in important respects, frankly, than both Europe and America has originally hoped for. There is no denying that it comes with a price tag for all negotiators because it would require proportionate concessions from everyone in order to bring these talks finally to a successful conclusion. There are no overwhelming negotiating triumphs to be brought home from this particular conference room, no overwhelming negotiating triumphs, but a lot to lose, frankly, if we donÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â€žÂ¢t succeed in bringing home success from the conference room. Aside from the losses of opportunity in trade, I believe that the cost of failure, in Doha, would be a much weaker international trading system in which to tackle the sorts of issues that now worry Europe and America the most, weaker because we will have demonstrated what too many skeptics have long believed, that the multilateral trading system is incapable of agreeing on a trade deal that is dedicated to development. And that will certainly damage the confidence of many and most developing countries in the international trading system and in the WTO. To the larger emerging economies it would also show ÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â‚¬Å“ who perhaps are not as genuinely committed to the success of the world trade round as their rhetoric would sometimes suggest ÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â‚¬Å“ that there is no consensus on open trade to be built. The center of the multilateral trading system, thatÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â€žÂ¢s what failure in the WTO would spell, thatÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â€žÂ¢s what it would represent. No multilateral trade deal, no multilateral trade round has ever failed in the history of trade rounds. For all of the reasons IÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â€žÂ¢ve set out today, I donÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â€žÂ¢t believe that we can allow Doha to be the first trade round to fail in our world. It would be an appalling start to this first decade of the 21st centuryÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â€žÂ¢s global age in which we live. So Jessica, let me say this in conclusion, close ties between Europe and the United States I think are still the main foundation of world politics and the global economy. For all those that we are embracing, for all those that we see emerging, for all those that we want to enfranchise economically and politically and in trade terms, we are, nonetheless, the main foundation of world politics and its economy. We, the EU and the U.S., have a deep store of shared values, of experiences, and of interests. The EU is beginning to transform itself from an internal market into an outward-looking political actor in the world, as President Sarkozy reflected in his speech to Congress yesterday. The EU and the U.S. cannot dictate every contour of the global age, but that does not mean that we will be dictated to either. Close cooperation between the EU and the U.S. should not be perceived or presented as an attempt to organize economic exchange exclusively on our own terms or to block the rise of others, but as a way to underwrite a strong, multilateral order based on cooperation and economic openness. We can only underwrite an open global economy by keeping our own markets open and our own trade fair, stripped of trade-distorting subsidies where they exist. We can underwrite a collective approach to shared challenges by making it clear that we see no other alternative route, perhaps most immediately in Bali next month, when we sit down to begin work on the next phase of a collective approach to tackling climate change. Whatever the temptation, whatever the temptations of disengagement, of protectionism or political insularity, they are not in our interests; they are not in the interests of the changing world of which we are a part. And therefore, on the eve of the Transatlantic Economic CouncilÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â€žÂ¢s first meeting, I think thatÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â€žÂ¢s the joint message that the EU and U.S. should be putting out to the rest of the world; thatÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â€žÂ¢s the message that should ring loud and clear. Thank you very much, indeed. (Applause.)