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Well, I'll go back on my list here. And Matt is next on my list. Where is Matt? Thanks well, these have been a very stimulating couple of days and I think the papers are excellent, but I think there is a number of additional issues that need to be addressed that we don't really have in the in the papers here, and I can provide a rich agenda for further research after the book that comes out of this meeting is done whether here or at other places or whenever. I think when I think about getting the rest of the world on board with an agenda like this really I think not only about process, but about motivation. What is going to convince the Indians and the Pakistanis and the Israelis and the Chinese and the Russians to be interested in doing this kind of thing? So I think that is a rich area for further reflection. I think when we started talking about the topic; we really have to define a little bit more. I think there are a lot of different versions of Zero that different people have in their minds and different points on this spectrum of latency. They will have different security implications and different risks and I and different verification implications, and I think this will be worth exploring that in some detail. I think while the point has been made and I think very correctly that we can't see what the world is going to be like when we get to Zero, until we have taken some of these intermediate steps first, which will create both confidence and create changes in the world. Nonetheless I think beginning to think now about the kinds of structures of international security that might be necessary to convince Pakistan it would be secure without nuclear weapons, or to convince Israel that they would be secure without nuclear weapons, is something that you know we need to start at least beginning the thinking process. Now and in terms of the near term steps, just a non-proliferation, I think that several items on nonproliferation that were in The Wall Street Journal, that are important, but they are not the only things that that need to be done. There is a lot of near term steps that need to be taken to shore up the nonproliferation regime in that 18 years of Iranian noncompliance with their safeguards agreement before we noticed is the evidence that we need stronger safeguards. A couple of decades the A.Q Khan network, before it finally got taken down as evidence, I think that we need a much better approach to dealing with black market nuclear network and that means police, it means intelligence, it means better export control, it means better structures within the companies to review what they themselves are doing. One of the most helpful things I heard in a last while a few months ago is the description by one of the companies that was embarrassed to find a lot of its equipment at Iraqi centrifuge facilities, about the kind of internal mechanisms they had set up since then to deal with that kind of thing. We need as Bob said, better enforcement, when we do have a problem with proliferation component. And we need of course the actions that are already in The Wall Street Journal Op-Ed that, securing nuclear stockpiles, cutting off production of fissile material, limiting the spread of enriched uranium reprocessing, and we are not going to get any of that unless the nuclear weapon states are perceived as holding up their end of the NPT bargain, which brings us back here. So that proliferation and arms reduction and disarmament agendas are intricately linked at least politically, and I think in some respects technically as well. The one thing the final thing I would want to say, I have been I think to some extent the gloom and doom voice here at how bad the situation is the security for nuclear material but, and let me start on the nuclear front, I think world disorder is not as bad as many people make it out to be. The drawback for all the particular proliferation crisis were basic right now and you said, well what is the situation? We have got nine states of nuclear weapons. 20 years ago we had nine states with nuclear weapons, and that 20 years includes the collapse of the Soviet Union and the chaos that followed that, it includes the entire period of the A.Q Khan Network; it includes the Iraqi secret nuclear weapons program, the Iranian secret nuclear weapon program, the Libyan secret nuclear weapon program. The fact that we made it through all of that with no net increase in the number of nuclear weapon states is actually I think an amazing success story. And I think if we take quite serious actions now there is at least some hope, that 20 years from now we would still only have nine states with nuclear weapons, and if we succeed in both Iran and North Korea, I think we will have one left. And that I think really ought to be our goal. I think there is a great danger in feeling as though the NPT is collapsing and that therefore not in the nonproliferation regime isn't going to work anymore and therefore we will have to take other actions, and the danger of that is that we fail to take the measures that we can take now to prevent those things from happening. So I wouldn't want everybody to walk away completely pessimistic about the nonproliferation regime. We've got a lot of challenges, but I think the regime has been more successful and is probably more resilient than a lot of people give it credit. Thank you; you have a nice smile when you say these things. Scott oh excuse me well, Scott. Like others here, I really congratulate the four horsemen and The Wall Street Journal, for opening up a global debate and thanking for bringing in many other colleagues from this great University at Stanford and old friends and new friends to continue this discussion with you. I am surprised however that one issue that we've gotten far less discussion about the one that we could do a lot about in the United States is US Nuclear Doctrine. Jack Matlock's excellent paper reminded us that throughout the Cold War, and continuing on with Iran and North Korea, threats to another country's security including nuclear threats are one of the major driving forces perhaps the major driving force that encourages states to want to get nuclear weapons, and conversely extended nuclear guarantees nuclear umbrellas may be a major force that can stop a state from going nuclear, when they might otherwise be interested in such activity. So I am struck at how we forget this in the body politic, and even though President or Vice-President of the United States says that all options are on the table with respect to Iran, it's striking to me how much that helps Ahmadinejad at home, and how much that alienates potential friends who might support us in activities against Iran. But I am also struck that when Condi Rice goes to Japan right after the North Korean tests, it was absolutely the right thing to do; to encourage them, with feel reassuring the American commitment. But here there is a big difference between the nuclear commitments that we made during the Cold War, that were designed to threaten nuclear first use in case the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union attacked our allies with overwhelming conventional force, and the nuclear umbrella that we can and mind you, should maintain, temporarily at least on the road to Zero, which says that we will use nuclear weapons to retaliate against nuclear threats against our friends and allies. But we don't need them to respond to conventional threats against our friends and allies any more, because we had so overwhelmingly superior. And that leads me to suggest that on the road to Zero that before first we really, seriously consider "no first use" as one step that the United States could take and I in my view have five benefits. One, it will reduce US threats in non-nuclear weapon states. Two, it will be a better a better model for other nuclear weapon states. And here I am particularly interested in India's movement away from its traditional "no first use." to follow a more "first use" policy. Third, it would have a limited but useful impact on US Military Planning, that could help address some of the questions that Henry quite rightly raised about automaticity when things going wrong in military operations. Fourth, it would be one more plus factor that we could use in the 2010 Review Conference, about things that the United States and other nuclear states are doing, that we are working in good faith towards the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. And lastly, it could still be done with maintaining second strike nuclear deterrence as an umbrella to our allies if they are attacked with nuclear weapons, because that would not be a first use by the United States. And so I would just encourage you to consider that seriously in the next Wall Street Journal article and to encourage many others to do the kinds of studies of how to implement such a doctrine in way that would be safe and secure. Well, I got on the list to say something about Korea, but things have been said and I don't feel obliged elaborate except on Richard's point. I think he makes the logical point that one way of motivating your friends and the Six Power Talks example, threatening to do something drastic internally. I believe in fact in 2003, after the initial Iraqi attack, China's motivation for getting deeply involved in the Six Power Process was precisely the fear that Pyongyang might be on starting this. But I think those threats seem a little empty now. We are pretty well extended; they tend to alarm our friends more than they intimidate our adversaries. And therefore I I find this a very untimely moment to take that too seriously. The word about Japan that I think rolling back the nuclear program is harder than arresting it short of the test. So the real tough negotiation on Korea is yet to come. And we need to pay very careful attention to avoiding doing any thing which inadvertently would increase the risk that one of the great successes of our nonproliferation policy is Japan comes on unraveled. And here I mentioned that in recent months the Japanese are fearful that we might drift into a situation which we grudgingly acquiesced in the existence of a North Korean nuclear capacity, because it's just too hard. But from their their standpoint, I don't regard Japan at an inflection point on this issue. But two very important thing that happened in the last decade or a decade and a half one is at the end the Cold War; they looked around and recognized they live in very tough neighborhood. The Chinese were going their military budget, building their missile force, they worry about that. And in conjunction with North Korea's nuclear ambition is that that accelerates movement in Japan toward becoming a more normal country. And that's manifested in a very practical way; they have taken a hard look at a number of self empowered restrictions on their defense program. And they have changed a lot of them, overseas deployment of troops, overseas security obligations, sharing military technology, exporting military item. Two things they haven't changed, although they've talked about them, is they manage their defense within one percent of GDP, very modest level of expenditure relative to what they could do. And they haven't adjusted the non-nuclear principles though it's not a taboo to talk about. We have a big stake in seeing that those self imposed limitations of Japan's defense programs persist. A lot of it depends upon the reliability of clarity of our alliance commitments. Final comment would be that someone said earlier that may be 2009 is the moment to sum up these things. I think in 2008 is the time to start. I am impressed by the number of practical links it could be done, or would be politically appealing to propose. And it seems to me on the one hand you have an administration that I would think would be interested in finding some legacy agents to add or at least get started in the time that remain. And you have candidates on the other side, and if you are looking through a series of generally staff people, who are looking for serious agenda items for 2009 and therefore I would argue that we should approach this with a sense of urgency, get a package of measures to get it quickly that could be out there, that are available for either side in our political campaigns, right. I have some general comments to make George. My first two parenthetical remarks; my first parenthetical remark has to do with Scott Sagan's suggestion that we look at questions of US nuclear practices and doctrine. And on that regard I'd like to call your attention to a report which is available for handout in the back of the room there Reducing Nuclear Threat and Preventing Nuclear Terrorism, the things that US can do by itself. The principle author is Bill Porter who is here and Bob Einhorn, Graham Allison and Ash Carter. So that report is available if you would like to look at it. Secondly, a very big okay to George and Sid and Jim Goodby, who were the principal panelists to this gathering, very well organized, you got to get the right sort of people with the right agenda, it has been to me a very stimulating very stimulating type of discussion. Henry made the same comment earlier. Now my general comments; at this meeting we have talked about two somewhat different things. We have talked about the no-nuke vision and nobody I think has expressed that better than Max did, both today and particularly last night at that general meeting, and the steps to adaptation which George and Sam and Sid have all expressed very effectively. I want to say that the thinking as I see at least, that propelled the Op-Ed which was written by the gang of four, was that a vision without the steps was not credible, particularly with many people who are in authority today, all over the world. And secondly the steps without the vision would not have the power or any energy to overcome the enormous inertia to doing the things that needed to be done, many of which are expensive and difficult and inconvenient. So as I would see it, they were propelling us what we had to pursue simultaneously these two visions, and exploit the synergy between them. And in doing that we had to pay very careful attention at the balance and the time. Now my own belief is that our near term efforts ought to be tilted to pursuing steps that value in and out of themselves, and they can be accomplished near term. I associate myself with the Mike's comment, well why don't we get things going in 2008, why should we wait for a new administration to come in and delay in getting new administration, again starting about two years late really. Many things can be done now and I would not write out the possibility getting support from this administration to taking some of these near term steps. Any progress we are making there will have a value in and out of itself however we are progressing towards the vision, to the extent we can increase warning time, we can increase the security of bombs and fissile material, to the extent we can decrease the number of nuclear weapons out there and the amount of fissile material out there. Each of these steps by themselves increases our security and reduces our danger. Also, the progress on those steps I think present a better position to move for the nonproliferation we were pursing. So I think they are synergist towards each other. Now, for many years in fact decades I would say, I could not imagine how we were going to get to Zero. And I could not imagine how the annual fixture was going to play out and for that reason did not support articulating a Zero Vision. In fact more than that, I believed that articulating the Zero Vision got in the way of the practical steps you could do to make things safer. I felt that strongly I have articulated that on a number of occasions. As I sit here, I still cannot conceive how the end game is going to be done; I still cannot imagine the details of how you actually get to Zero. But if we can reach what Sam Nunn referred to as the high ground, the various steps we are taking to get on the high ground, the world will be different, the circumstances will be different, and we will be in a far better position than to contemplate and trying to plan the end game. So while I still cannot envision how that end game is going to go, I have changed my thinking on that. I have come to believe that pursuing both these together; strongly articulating the Zero vision while at the same time moving energetically towards the practical steps to reduce the danger, so together well should be pursued simultaneously and with energy on both legs; thank you George. Thank you, Bill. Sid has been trying to construct a kind of summary of things to do and may be then close to what Bill was saying so may be I can add some comments. Yeah, with so much speech, I agree with everything. But you know George and Jim and I have much have talked about the steps, and we had ideas, and last night I wrote down a list, I showed it to Jim this morning, George commented on it, so it improved a little bit. So let me just say just express just what you say. Well, buying about Bill's concern about the urgency, because of Iran, which I think we have to start in 2008, not 2009. And I and also I said what what is the first phase first step, you know phase Zero is what we are doing now. We have to continue reductions, there is no question. But for phase one, I said what are the we said, what are the possible steps? One is US and Russia should essentially declare support for the General Dvorkin menu. The endorsement need for binding agreements, the importance of improving transparency for monitoring what's going on in the nuclear world that area, review a firmed vision of Zero nukes as providing the context and reaffirm stability in the nuclear world as our goal. That's that's part one this is all phase one. Next; we increase warning time. First we declare there is Zero Launch on Warning in our policy. Secondly, we drop massive attack options that is deterrence whatever remains, don't no longer means Mutual Assured Destruction, the big mass to side up them. We introduce procedural or operational changes and both confidence defined just having stated operational changes, but we build confidence so that we can begin to talk about introducing some physical controls of the type that Bruce has mentioned. We actually talk about the first step of the batteries removed from ICBMs or the invertors from the SLBMs. And I think I have to put right up there now, we have to before we go any further we have to have serious negotiations toward a cooperative ABM site in Europe. I think any notion of reducing weapons or what not if we haven't put on a in a balanced constructive way, this idea of ABM site in Europe, in Poland and Czechoslovakia will be a will be a problem. And I think so I hope that the leaders would build on the kind of rhetoric we hear, some of which sounds like posturing for an election, but we really are serious if this is to be a cooperative venture. This is something Presidents Bush and Putin called for in 2001, when they said we are going to have cooperative work on ballistic missile defense, also on early warning. Then why don't we stand up the early warning standard they had talked about then. We have to strengthen the NPT. This is all part of phase one. And that means working to spread to more countries, the acceptance to the additional protocols, the proliferation security initiative, and begin the debate once again on CTBT, because I think that is a very important part of it. We must continue to emphasize the importance of giving high priority to Nunn-Lugar and extending it to the global threat reduction initiative and the discussions on the first part of what Einhorn Bob Einhorn talked about, may need a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, because most countries are baying that already. And it will take longer, but engage seriously in controlling the fuel cycle. Those were the things now, what do you what are you saying? I am saying let's add Sam Nunn's idea about 1540. Oh yes, I am sure, yeah. That so it seems to me these are all part of things we can do right now. I think they are all integral. I really feel that to make any progress in further reductions beyond this, continuing what we are doing, we have to get the ABM problem. So all I think the NPT has to be strengthened, I think our commitment to the CTBT is important and I think this is all practical and -. Could I add one more and that is work on the verification, because that expires in 09' and we really need to have some clarifications. Yes yes I just I absolutely agree that that's I agree. And you said item one was the Dvorkin menu and I think that's included in the Dvorkin menu. That is yeah, okay. Yeah. Shall I? I take two observations relevant to the to the discussion here. I think it makes a lot of sense to focus on the points that you already identified in your Wall Street Journal article. I think we all have other items that we would pitch as important, but the one that I think is perhaps most important, given the recognition that the climb up to this mountain is going to take a long time, is the focus on utility of education, changing mindsets and building an international community of individual young people in particular who could -. Education goes without saying I mean it's basic. My reason for mentioning it as Sergio will know, is that there was a UN General Assembly, a resolution in 2002, which addressed disarmament, nonproliferation, education. There were 34 specific recommendations it was without the vote is now being introduced into the NPT context, and I think that some of the things that we are talking about here today would benefit from our focus obviously. One very specific idea would be the creation of a National Nonproliferation Education Act, perhaps model that with the Defense Education Act, which we passed after Sputnik were concerned that we needed to study foreign languages. I would argue that today we need to introduce more course offerings at more universities to train young people who are knowledgeable about this issue. That's my first point. My second point this has to do with the phase of internationalizing this this process. Here are already a number of major initiatives that are underway among likeminded political groupings, perhaps the most important one of which is the new agenda coalition. One might argue that the success in the 2000 NPT Review Conference was to a large extent the role played by the new agenda coalition in bridging the gulf between the nuclear weapon states and the non-nuclear weapon states. I would argue that even when it was tremendously important to bring in Russians here, that were the United States to say as they did in 2000, that we can accept 95 percent in the coalition you then have been placed in an international context, particularly the NPT context, a very strong grouping political grouping, whose agenda closely resembles of that of the group here. George said we are starting in the international outreach -. Just before you can, let me try to consolidate something here. What Sid I think was telling us is a potential follow on Op-Ed might go something like this. At this first Op-Ed and we conveyed in other meeting and we talked about the different steps. And as we discuss them we saw that there are quite a number of very important things that could be done right now. And here they are, sort of so let's keep building on that kind of structure. I just wanted to sort of nail that point. Excuse me about it. Well other than commending you and the NTI for doing this, like Henry I have learned a huge amount and I think coming away from yesterday, one feels that this is surely a valid goal and that the mechanics and rather different periods to Vision Zero, a logical plausible scenario. Today salient invention was Henry's point of strategic point of order that Iran's trying to set the house on fire here and that unless we find a way to cope with this problem, as the nation state system evolves for some in cohort future, that our ability to accomplish this larger movement is is very much in doubt. In trying to imagine what cohort one could imagine might actually prevail in resolving the Iranian issue, the P-5 seems like a plausible place to start and yet, I just came back from China and meetings with the government and with the party, it was very clear that our country hasn't had precedence in the past years of making the cases on shared intelligence and the basis for our alarm about Iran. Probing questions from the military, the PLA as well as the government and the party, "What do you mean there is a delivery system? Do they really have a design?" Well you would imagine these things would have been well known. But I don't think they were just being bog in the manger about the next thing is letting others the Europeans to deal with it. So that's to underscore the kind of the urgency and the importance of bringing Russia and China into a much more active dialogue, about how with the European countries, we can work together to bring the sanctions that will be needed to persuade Iran to curtail its program. But in that context there are related steps that I am sure you can imagine, that is how do you resolve the anxieties of people in the region; Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt and others about regional security faced with this potential threat in the years ahead, and the value of talking to them about a regional security organization. 25 years ago I was charged by Secretary Haig to handle the dialogues with General Zia in Pakistan. And it was obvious that we couldn't provide the kinds of security guarantees, that he naturally worried about, outnumbered seven to one in most measures of military power vis-ÃƒÆ’Ã†â€™Ãƒâ€šÃ‚Â -vis India, not that we nor plausibly China could do that, provide the security guarantee as well. Could we someday the sunny side of the Persian gulf today; probably not. Those are issues that are to be considered, but finally as I bring up some of it was Mike's point about the urgency of Iran and getting along with this broader agenda, I don't mean to be demeaning, but it seems implausible that our own government in the United States is going to be able to do that or that it will. It is preoccupied and understandably. But I am by again commending what you have already done. This gang of four and Max; backed by this concentration of intellect which is reminiscent on President Kennedy's comment; "It's a powerful, powerful team" and I think - really I would think yourselves and recurring affairs as well as and more activists flows in Moscow and Beijing in particular really as a huge amount to offer; to get us past immediate crisis and back to the point of getting to Zero. So thanks I really benefited hugely. Thank you. Don you are next on my list here. Well when I walked into this room yesterday morning, I was almost overwhelmed looking around this room to see the levels of expertise, experience and wisdom that sat around here and I am no less impressed today. But I've learned a lot. And one of the things I have learned I think is the wisdom of looking at this in a constructive way. This it was a simplified Shultz Rowan Piece that was in the packet of information; seven pages seven pillars of wisdom or seven pages of wisdom. And that is to look at this in a practical way. They talked like a construction firm; you put issues into two piles. One is a pile that you could do something about right away and you can make some progress. And the other pile is one you don't give up on, but you know it's going to take a long, long time to get anything much what's done and you try to do it little by little in a constructive way. That's the way economists work. That's why I believe George Shultz was a very success as a Secretary of State, because he thought like an economist, not like a political scientist and not like a politician. Nicest thing that has been said about economists somewhat. No that's faint praise in other words somebody said they wanted went on to comment. But anyway, this what was discussed led to the conclusion that the real danger here is the jumping to conclusions. And another thing, danger is apathy and inertia and the lack of a champion a champion who is who has the stake in the office. Max is a champion in his own way, but he doesn't command the attention that a a President or presidential candidate or somebody who is generally everybody listens to that much. I think that's important. I would like to also say that I would not wish to be associated in anyway whatsoever with a move on Iran. Iran is three times the size and weight of Iraq. It is a center of Middle East ideology in a way that Iraq never was. I think this would be exactly in the wrong direction. The gravity of the Iran problem is great. There's no doubt about that. But you don't get to Zero nuclear weapon by starting a new war. I don't think the American people would support it. I think it would open up a huge Pandora's Box. I think negotiations are wide open. I have the case of North Korea. I think North Korea is quite a success story at the moment. It's not eliminated all the nuclear weapons. But by the end of next week there are going to be American technicians up at Yongbyon, with their screw drivers, helping to disable their only nuclear reactor. And they are going to be poking around and looking at the aluminum tubes to see what they may have made in the way of centrifuges. Those are immense accomplishments even though they don't completely solve this problem. So from my view I just think it's been a wonderful experience to be here, to listen to this, be part of it to the extend that I could understand it, and I commend you all and your work, but I go back to the Hippocratic Oath, "First, do no harm." Thank you. Dick, you are next on my list. I'd like to associate my remarks with Don's and especially in thanking this conference. For me technical issues have been eliminated for me and I have learned a great deal. My father was a traveling salesman and visited the lower 48 before he was 21, driving a Model T and Model A Ford Model A, Model T, whichever where they came. And there is one basic rule that I really never understood for so many years that you lecture children about is that nothing happens until somebody sells something, nothing happens until somebody sells something. After a while it began to dawn on me that this was really very very important concept. And I think talk about much about 1987, Gorbachev and Reagan, because that's the occasion of this conference, the anniversary, certainly a stimuli to think about it. But in the years just before that perhaps the decade just before that Jack Matlock made three very important and impressive points, that there are lessons to be drawn from Reykjavik, the procedures and postures that make the lessons work need to be learned and implemented. So he stressed the importance of direct communication. And Bill Perry said the fourth important point in that line up vision without steps is simply not credible. Back in 1970s since the group of people and created the Committee on the Present Danger second generation of the famous committee, and there is now the third; Gene Rosedale a piece that was deeply impressive and I wrote to Gene Rosedale and he told me that Charlie Walker was involved in trying to put together a group, and the group included Paul Metz, Henry Fowler, Joe Fowler, Max Kampelman, particularly Jean Patrick, and we began to work in 1976 and decided not to open the committee for business service people. So after the 1976 election it was decided, and we did a small group and gradually grew in numbers to the consternation of law of people, received no presentation. But in the mean time Ronald Reagan became interested in work of the Committee of the Present Danger, read its various publications, joined and then began to meet with people from other parties and other planet if you will. Reagan was never disposed to demonize the opposition and was always disposed to work across the isle and these individuals met with him and deeply influenced his opinions over the period of years prior to the opportunity particularly in 1979 and in early 1980 itself. No one necessarily came out politically. But he allowed a great deal and there were lot of gaps in his thinking and his knowledge basic instincts that were primeval so to speak some of that primitive. He never minded being underestimated and always enjoyed learning from other people. He spent countless hours. In fact it's fair to say that Reagan spent more time on arms control issues arms control and disarmament than the vernacular of the day, or in any of the central subject in the entire preparation for the presidency. He studied, read, go back now and see the work is being done here at the Hoover Institution and revealing Reagan's already thinking and the diaries, radio broadcast. And so he entered office filled with substance and filled with ideas. And this played directly into his basic instincts about weapons generally and about nuclear weapons in particular. Though he was prepared as the outset at the gate coming out of the gate, that a strategy had to be perfected several years, It was until 1987 that there could be a Reykjavik of for all sorts of reasons, but he was prepared and held the conceptual framework, all of it was in mind. Now that just reinforces my own notion having participated in two presidential campaigns in the outsight, working with people who had ideas civic ideas, Nixon in the case of Vietnam, Reagan in the case of the all the resolution of the Cold War, getting America well again. That the group here want to redouble those efforts very quickly, coming back to Mike Armacost and points being made by other, to get something in shape, something small, readable and understandable to present to every political candidate I think there are 17 or 18 of them along the block, and be particularly prepared to brief that convention conventions next year, be present and have the ability to communicate with the principle advisors of both political campaigns, because the vision without the steps are not credible. And nothing really does happen until somebody sells something and politics is about selling ideas. It's already Reagan's approach whenever the politicians into to office, to high office in the same way. In other words, a strategy and the strategy of this group would be to get time and the tension from those who count, because any president who enters office and when you speak here of 08' and 09', any president who enters on January 20th at noon in 2009 is not going to have any time for new ideas for six months, until they first found the rest rooms and done the other organizational tours that accompany a new administration. So you are all a very bunch of a group of very enlightened and bright people. But the mechanism is going to be to get to leaders. And on one hand you have the capacity and the standing to go to leaders elsewhere in the world, the question is can you get the time and need to get the attention the deep attention of political candidates, one of whom will be President of the United States in 2009. Thank you. David Hamburg. Yeah, it has been a remarkable meeting. A lot of things were said, how indebted we are. If there were time I would have a number of questions on diplomatic, political and psychological aspects and may be follow it up with Shultz, Matlock and Kampelman. But I am not going to try to take that time. I am trying to think operationally about next steps for this group. I like very much the brilliant summary that Sid Drell just made, and the notion of translating that - George would used that into a for the next Op-Ed piece. I think that's very practical and very important, to show the public that getting momentum for this group and not being struck in a rut the first set of ideas, we are moving onto the second set of ideas and in the end, beyond that. Now one of the strong consensus I hear with all the three years is that this group wants to work for world wide cooperation, broaden our horizon, yet to extent possible the idea of the vision of zero nukes and intermediate steps that makes sense. There is that do what we can to mobilize the worlds intellectual, technical, economic and moral strength toward a zero nuclear world; recognizing that's it's no longer the case that the the intellectual capacity, the action ingenuity is only in the US, they are in relation with Russia. Its much broader that, now. It's a while since World War II was over. And I was glad to hear some positive references to Europe. I think there has been a terrible underestimation of the capacity of the Europe, in almost every dimension in the last few years and and we need to involve more Europeans among others. Now the question is what what Russia now wait for a moment what Russia is why should people care there are different place all over the world, why should they care? I think the fundamental thing is to understand the immense danger to everyone everywhere and that is not clear. The foundations will tell you that they dropped out pretty much a human conflict with the exception the of Macarthur and Manley, this musical interlude of the human the adoration for human foundations have dropped out of this, you know because Cold War is over and there is no real danger of nuclear weapons anymore, is an uninformed, complacent to some sort of people who are not stupid. And I think to a considerable extent that exists all over the world. So there has to be some kind of understanding of the fundamental point, it's an immense danger to everyone everywhere. Nobody's invulnerable anymore. And how to get to that. I think we need to clarify the advantages the fact that the advantages of nuclear weapons are really illusory, and the disadvantages of having nuclear weapons are real, the threat to physical survival, the economic drain, growing of existential fear. So the advantages and disadvantages need to be kind of turned on their head and we heard some of that during this meeting. We heard less about the creation of better alternative, because it's a big, long term cooperative job. International cooperation, especially by the affluent, technically advanced countries like ours to help out democratic, social, economic development everywhere to the extent possible. That is a big job, but if some kind of vision of a better life is not available, the countries that are currently in trouble, it would be very, very hard to achieve what this group would like achieve. That means that the particularly the established democracies have the cool strength, intellectual, technical, economic political, moral strengths towards these ends. The core assets are the communities of established democracies acting partly within the UN and partly outside the UN. In the UN were possible in The Spirit of the UN Charter always, sometimes outside UN because the practical obstacles mainly provided by the dictators in the UN, both the Security Council and the assembly. The current you know I think one other I want to say in any event we need to enlarge this excellent effort by bringing others from various countries into the next meeting there should be a next meeting. I was talking to Sid and George, there will be one, now who from other countries? Probably experts first I think, probably people comfortable with those here and they do this elsewhere in the world. So some mix of the people here and people like us here, from other countries. I mentioned European, but not just European, I think there ought to be clearly a sprinkling at least of other non US, non European, in the next meeting. Then I think we need to think about what Bill Porter touched on that is reaching educated publics in various countries, and gradually build a constituency for reducing nuclear danger as a salient issue to people everywhere, both the necessity and the feasibility of doing it. And the education thing because all the way from school children to Stanford graduate students to leaders, there ought to be an annual conference probably sponsored by the Secretary General of the United Nation, if not somebody else. Those inviting those who have been elected in the past year as Prime Ministers, as Foreign Ministers, as Defense Ministers, Development Ministers, Education Ministers in other words, people emerging in the new leadership positions to learn about these issues. Reducing the nuclear danger and in a broader context what terminologies and what concrete steps we can possible not just mandatory, but vision with the concrete steps that now exists. Overall I think this group can be the powerful fingers to mobilizing many kinds of strength for drastically reducing the nuclear danger if the efforts are sustained and well contested over years to come. And George I thank you and Sid and others for an extraordinary contribution, one of the best meetings I have ever attended. Thank you. We have a little time left. I have David Holloway, Rose, John McLaughlin, Ash and Bruce. So if you would -. I have two points. But one was better than I could make it by Sid Drell, and the second point concerns nuclear weapons in the international system. Philip Zelikow mentioned the Acheson-Lilienthal Report yesterday and Oppenheimer who is the kind of Chief Author of the report did not think that the international system as then constituted could live with nuclear weapons. They would make war not only more destructive but also more likely. And an international system that had generated two world wars in the first half of the Twentieth Century, what was one to look forward to. Well so the idea of the report was essentially to take nuclear weapons out of international relations. Well that didn't happen. But the point I want to make is that I think over the course of Cold War and the post Cold War period, international system has shown quite a lot of creativity in devising different mechanisms and institutions - you could think of deterrence as one and the IAEA, arms control generally, the nonproliferation regime contact between expert groups and scientists on an unofficial level. Mechanisms for trying to deal with the challenges that nuclear weapons pose, these have been rather peace meal efforts and one might make the judgment that they weren't very effective for that some of them were more harmful than useful. But nevertheless I think it's striking if one looks back at the history how much that there has been a good deal of creativity in the system. Reykjavik in that context was I think a breakthrough. It did express an impatience with one of the chief mechanisms for managing the US-Soviet relationship and that is with arms control, by trying to make kind of radical breakthrough in the negotiations and it had of course considerable success. Another example in the post Cold War world of institutional creativity is the Nunn-Lugar programs, really quite an exceptional concept that an unprecedented idea of getting involved in the most secret areas secret areas of national power and to to have cooperation in those. So what I have take from this and perhaps especially from Reykjavik is that, as we do move into or as we are in a much more complex international system, to look back on these and to draw some hope that in fact creativity will continue, we will be able to devise mechanisms for dealing with the new challenges that nuclear weapons confront us with. And I think that's one of the values of having the vision as well as thinking about the steps is that it does forces to think not only about technical issues but also more broadly about institutional, very broadly defined or strategic issues. And I think the point made yesterday morning that these things do have to be looked at in a broad context of international development of the international system is very relevant, and I think it has helped to inform our discussions in a very useful way. Thank you. Rose. Thank you, you know one area that we haven't expressed quotation of for yet this afternoon is the way in which this Op-Ed and it's aftermath has changed probably discourse on this matter. And so I wanted to express my personal appreciation and also say I think it's the right idea to continue the momentum as David Hamburg said with further Op-Ed writing. But I also want to suggest another angle that could be very valuable in the arena of public discourse and also education, as Bill Porter suggested. I have been thinking that perhaps we need a fresh eye looking at this question. We have the best experts in the American community and one of the absolute best experts in the Russian community in this room today. But perhaps we need a fresh eye. So I have been thinking about the idea of constituting a Team B to look at this set of questions. John McLaughlin may not like that term very much, but I was thinking about a team of talented young people who have been through the classrooms here at Stanford, at Harvard, Bill Porter's program at Monterey, putting together a Team B of young people who have understanding, have been through course work in these area and could come together as a team and take a fresh look have a fresh eye. I think It could really augment the excellent work that's being done in this project group and could add a boost to the whole effort to have a group of young people who are willing to look at the issue and then to perhaps convey publicly, but also to their own generation about the importance of these issues. So important educational functions, additional bounce for this effort in the public discourse, and I think it's an idea worth looking at. Can I ask for a clarification? Do you mean just within the US for your Team B or possibly internationally? I have had discussions about this in Moscow. Interestingly enough, my Russian colleagues say, well you may not like the answer you get from Russian students, because Russian students are very conservative, they don't like the notion of going to zero nuclear disarmament, that type of thing, so you may not like the answer you get. I am not sure what answer we would get from the US team, but I think it would be a one with some fresh ideas in it, but probably very supportive of the overall answer. Well I think all the big ideas are out on the table. I wanted to make a procedural comment and then may be two steps two points briefly. In talking to these two people about these ideas I find it takes a while for people to digest them, just as it has taken for us a while. I am thinking about your next meeting and if it were to be an international meeting, I think there might be merit in inviting the right experts from the P-5 countries, other countries as well, but include the P-5, on the theory that the UN is going to be more important globally, and why not start some sort of format going in those countries. I think Chinese in particular will gag a little bit on all of these and want to refer it back and not quite know whether they have got talking points to get a deal. They have problems. But have I just think there will be merit in starting to inject these ideas in the P-5 countries very systematically. Secondly, on Iran, I just want to say there are still some a lot of things we haven't done short of military action. So I think there is still some elasticity in our policy here. For example, I don't know that we have given serious thoughts to sanctions on gasoline. Iran gets a third of its gasoline from imports and they come from 16 different counties, the largest being Europe and India. It would be hard to enforce, but it would have a real bite. In fact it might be almost as inflammatory as military action, given that there are already protests in Iran about gasoline crisis. So there are still sharp things to do short of military action. Gasoline certainly is inflammatory. I think people just thought about it. But may be you know more than I do about this. I don't know that we have come to grips with it yet, but it's out there as an idea. And there are a lot of other ideas short of war which you could do, that people haven't really thought much about. Yeah and finally I'd just say you know I think we all in some way have difficulty visualizing what Zero is. But I also have trouble visualizing what a world free terrorism is. There will always be terrorism in the world. Eventually we will reduce it to the point where it's a nuisance. It would be there at some level but it would be manageable. If we could achieve anything close to that in this realm, not that nuclear weapons would ever be only a nuisance, but if you could get them to the point where it's a discernable problem as distinct from today; that could be a world changing event. So I don't think we should get too hung up on our inability to visualize Zero. That's a very key point of David Holloway's speech for me. That's only a responsive course for the virtual force. Yeah, you know we will never stamp out crime either. But they have done a pretty good job in New York City. That's not a political comment. That's all I have to say. I have some of what I had to say is now lost in this little time. Also but I congratulate you. You have a looks to me like an 08' list, 09' list and a future list. And Sid wrote down the 08' list, and if you don't get anywhere with that, then try it in 09' along with the 09' list. All that seems to make sense, so if we categorize the Russian Arms Control US-Russian Arms Control part, the nonproliferation part and the terrorism part; and the only observation I wanted to make was it really goes back to earlier exchange about Iran which which had the flavor is if things go badly in Iran, does that doom this effort and doom the NPT? And that may be true as a political matter, but I don't really think much of what is on the any of these three lists has got much buried on Iran. And as you advertise this you may well be honest about that. The right way to say it is if we have done these 10 years ago we might not be where we are. But the Iranian and North Korean situations have both passed the point; I think where general solutions that much buried on. They are now in phase where a particular solution need to be found, and if you don't say that now people will assume that none of us is worth believing and cat is out of the bag or or something. Analytically that's not correct and if you are going to fall victim to that what if we do this stuff, the nonproliferation stuff now, what it does is make less likely a cascade down the road of new parties, not Iran and North Korea, but the might be's; many of whom are friends of ours and we will find it very difficult to approach Japan excited, South Korea, Taiwan and the East Asian theater. And in the Middle East there is basically a Turkish cascade and an Arab cascade. Turkey speaks for itself and the Arab cascade, its Egypt, Saudi Arabia and so forth. This is if we get into a situation where these countries begin to move; they are A; friends of ours, and they are not happening in onesies and twosies; they are happening as a phalanx. And that would be a new phenomenon in nonproliferation which has been mostly about a rogue here, a rogue there, not a phalanx of friends simultaneously. And it will be a very difficult thing to manage. So that's really what the nonproliferation piece of this is about, its heading off that cascade, and if you don't take action now then you might find yourself in that situation 10-20 years from now as the seeds of these programs are planted. Once the public gets it in its mind, like Iran's public is getting it in its mind, that it's entitled to this, once the military and scientific bureaucracies are built, things become inexorable. And so you can be planting the seeds now for something that won't become apparent for 20 years, was born now what was born now in the wake of the failures at Iran and North Korea. And everything which you have on your list I think bears upon that, but doesn't realistically bear upon either Iran and North Korea. So just a piece of advice to not allow adverse circumstances in those two situations to discredit this whole effort, which I think is terrific and worthy. Thank you. Bruce. Am I the last person on the list? I would better begin. So be brief. I will try. Henry's recollection of his view of Launch on Warning during his tenure in the White House job, my memory of the declassified top secret transcript that I read about may be five years ago, the conversation in the White House in between on this very subject between President Ford and I think it was Francisco Croft and Henry Kissinger, and you have to be careful about these transcripts that are being declassified after 30 years. But your recollection is exactly accurate. You expressed that view in that transcript in that conversation, as I recall do you remember the conversation? I expressed I expressed the same view? And you said as I recall you asked everyone to take a bow that no one would ever acknowledge that fact publicly, because of the value of the uncertainty that this timing of response. But I was struck by that transcript primarily by the sense that it was out of touch with the reality of the all the US commands still in the 1970s. By the time that you and Schlessinger and I guess President Nixon who was part of the decision that declared the DefCon 3 during the Cold War where I was on duty at the Minuteman Launch Control Center at that moment. By that time we we were on the you know in the inside game, we were playing on Launch on Warning more than any thing else. So shortly after this successful deployment of our DSP satellite, which gave us you know incredible ability respond quickly, with due phenomenology and all the rest, and the systems at that time were rapidly evolving toward Launch on Warning and would have exerted extreme pressures on the National command authorities to make decisions, to choose the course of action before the impact of the incoming weapon apparent incoming weapon, that if the Russian system follows in a parallel track, a few years later, their satellite system didn't achieve the same level of success, now it is exactly equal the constellation the satellite constellation employed in the early 80's and then Russian command systems and early warning networks strictly followed in our footsteps and evolved a similar arrangement. And that's why I think we have a really a very nice document here from Vladimir Dvorkin, which expresses this concern about continuing the reliance on Launch on Warning and acknowledgment of that fact and I I hope that this agreement that Vladimir has written here exactly in agreement to exclude the possibility of strategic missile launch on false alarm, it is part of Sid's list. I don't know if it's on your mindset, its part of the Dvorkin menu. I think it's very important to us. I really like your list there. I would I would like to work with Vladimir on track one in an effort the development of the ideas given here and I would just close by saying, I would also add de-targeting to to that list, the real de-targeting as opposed to the cosmetic variety that we adopted in 1990's, where we did not had a single solitary segment to the amount of time it takes to launch our strategic forces, that we really we have been through a real exercise of de-targeting the missiles, particularly those involved in the massive attack option; we should really reliably strip that option out, that dangerous option out of weapons world. I have asked Henry to make some observations and then I would like call on Bill, Harry and Sam for whatever comment they would like to make, if any. Harry. George, I am not going to try to summary, that's an excellent I hope your final observations Sid especially with his next steps, really important and needs to be acted on. I think also and that just looking at the paper that George and I did, thinking about changes, in light of this discussion everybody that the paper writers need to make changes. I am sure based on this truly truthful discussion. I had no idea yesterday morning when this began, how many interesting practical actions could be taken. I mean this is quite an impressive list. The framework, then there is this array of things, which you can say, look, I didn't dependent on it you don't need a framework, well it helps having a framework. But I think its really credible group. So I commend those, everybody contributed to this list. And that's what really all I want to say. George, thank you, and Sid and Jim and I would also like to thank the staff who worked with you all. John and Brook are both here, Charlie Curtis couldn't be here. I think it has been a terrific conference. This is a very powerful group of people, because of the respect in this room and because of the experience. We all know we have to go international with this. We all know this cannot be American century. We all know as I view we are in a race between cooperation and catastrophe that. And I think the next step is indeed international. But we really need to keep this group thinking together because it can make a big difference, not only here but I think in the world. Thank you very much. Okay, when we get the possible Op-Ed done, we will circulate that around for comments again, on the same that we - now we will have a subsequent conference and we see there are lot of things that are going on and it could be done now. So why not then get it done? That would be the basic thing. The papers that have been submitted, they are the property of the author and they are going through whatever revisions they care to make and get them back and then they will get they will be published, and we will get that out as promptly as possible. You would get it back by November 25th, as we see. Alright, our guy with the bell here. And again I could say the same to every body, it has been a a great privilege to associate with all of you in this discussion, it was a very good discussion and then as we would like to say that's - I will be if anybody who didn't sign the release forms, please sign it. I have to say that I certify -. So let's track arms and get the hell out of here.