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Now let us turn to the papers and we will start with the subject of further reductions and nuclear forces. And I'll ask David and then General to make a brief statement about their respect to papers, and then will open the floor to discussion of the papers, so David. Right, thank you very much. I have passed around this morning a summary of my paper. I apologize that I did not have key judgments at the beginning of the paper when you received this some weeks ago. We succeeded with some luck, I think in surviving the cold war, but the current nuclear order is just proving much more difficult to manage, and the dangers of attempting to continue with the current failing order have become ever more apparent, leading us I think to understand how important it is to rekindle the Gorbachev Reagan vision of a world without nuclear weapons. And, what I have tried to do in my paper was not so much to specify what such a world would look like, what institutions it would need, what norms, but rather to set out a series of stages by which me may travel towards that goal with starting with a stage that I characterize as a feasible stage and ending with a stage I characterize as conceivable for to stage on the verge of elimination, or preceding the move to elimination. My failure to treat or analyze what a world without nuclear weapons would be like is not because I think the vision of the goal is unimportant. It is rather springs from the notion that we would be involved in a process, and in that process we would learn things about the impact of deeper reductions in nuclear weapons, and on the way to the goal, the goal itself being clear. The precise definition of what such a world would be like would itself be the subject of further reflection and analysis. The I conclude from recent the final statements by the United States and Russia the following things; one that neither country now sees the other as an imminent threat, nuclear threat or as the main source of nuclear danger, but neither is ready to dismiss completely, the danger of a nuclear threat arising from the other in the future. Both countries remain committed to the use of nuclear weapons for the deterrence, but both countries see themselves facing new nuclear threats for which the deterrence is not necessarily the appropriate policy, and so nuclear deterrence remains an element, an important element in the policies to both U.S. and Russia but it no longer occupies the central position that once occupied, and neither country regarded as the most effective instrument for dealing with the most urgent nuclear threats. And I think two general conclusions follow from this, that even within the a frame mark of deterrence, it should be possible to make substantial reductions for the two countries to make substantial reductions in strategic nuclear forces. And second to the extent that the U.S. and Russia are both concerned about what might happen in the future rather than about a current pressing threat. There is no reason why strategic nuclear forces should be operationally deployed rather than held in a responsive mode. I go through a number of stages. I apply three broad criteria for assessing the viability and of the different stages of reductions, the criterion of strategic stability, criterion of transparency and possibility of verification. And third and very important I think is the criterion of what contribution does this make to the overall goal of eliminating nuclear weapons. I spell out what I think is a feasible first stage, for both the United States and Russia could reduce the number of operationally deployed strategic nuclear war heads to around one thousand, with an additional on the fight number and the responsive force. That number one thousand could be inserted into the existing Moscow treaty and place of the current target, and along with that, the parts of the star treaty relevant verification at monitoring should be extended beyond December 2009 are incorporated in to a new agreement. And those two steps alone I think would give right impetus to the process of making substantial reductions, and if they were accompanied by reduction of the alert status of forces in lying with Bruce Blair's proposals, I think that would be a further significant contribution. Suggest a couple of other stages in U.S. and Russian reductions, but the final reduction as stage is where I discuss the importance of bringing in the other nuclear powers, and I think at some point in the process of nuclear disarmament sooner probably sooner rather than later. The U.S. and Russia would seek, should seek commitments from the other nuclear powers not to increase their nuclear warheads significantly beyond the levels they now have to a great greater transparency and ultimately to inclusion and an international regime of monitoring and verification, and thirdly to maintain nuclear forces in a responsive mode, rather than operationally deploy. And that fourth stage, I think it brings takes us in to less predictable territory and would need good deal of careful study and analysis, but nevertheless it seems to me a conceivable stage, so what I have tried to do is to set out a first important stage on this path guided by the goal of elimination, and to suggest further stages of reductions, which as one proceeds further require a lot of careful analysis. There are a lot of issues, technical and operational issues I have not felt able to do within the paper, but I think I would like to reinforce what I take to be one of Max Kampelman's major messages that the oath, the goal itself, the vision, is extremely important in defining the issues of a more concrete and specific kind that we feel we have to tackle in order to move forward. Thank you David, General Dvorkin? We circulated the general's paper, and I hope everybody got it. Thank you very much. I would like to speak Russian, excuse me. I really like David Holloway's paper, and I think it is a profound study of the issue of nuclear force reductions. In contrast to his approach, my paper is a road map to a nuclear force or to to nuclear reductions. My paper deals with all the major conditions that would make such reduction possible. The you know, one one of the conditions is the need for a new agreement on so so strategic so strategic force reductions and though and though as far as I know on the latest 2 plus 2 meeting of ministers of foreign affairs and defense, that is one and show which there was no disagreement that there is a there we need we need a new agreement. I am addressing only the issue of strategic nuclear weapons because regarding non-strategic excellent paper by a Rose Gottemoeller, which I highly recommend. I propose the new lower level of 1,300 1,500 warheads. I would gladly cut it down to 1,000 as David Holloway has proposed, but I you know, but I sort of did not go that far because I have always heard that the department of defense of the United States is afraid to go below 2,000 warheads because of China factor. Right now as noted here, China has been very restrained, but one there are reasons to worry about a breakout or they will lead forward. One of the most important steps towards nuclear disarmament is the mutual of the is is the renunciation by the U.S. and Russia of mutual deterrence. Unfortunately, I do not see much support for this kind of move in Russia. President Putin proposed broadening the INF treaty to to include, you know basically all nations to make it a global treaty. Yeah I think this this idea is as good as it is impractical. I think that if Russia leaves that INF treaty, then every country in Europe including Luxemburg and Monte Carlo will be asking for American missile defense systems. Still, a compromise between Russia and the United States compromise on the ballistic missile defense could turn in to an important step-forward towards nuclear disarmament, paradoxical as it is. In order to achieve a compromise, both you know both sides should find a way to save face. The U.S. could for example to take an obligation not to develop more than one missile defense base in Europe, and not to be in too much of a rush to deploy interceptors in Poland. Well, Russia could drop its demand that either demand that either U.S. agrees to use the Kabala radar in a in a Azarbaijan or it it precedes it proceeds with installations in Poland and Czech Republic, there is no cooperation. If a compromise is reached a joint work of ballistic missile defense could become a breakthrough towards nuclear disarmament. One of the steps towards disarmament could be renunciation of launch and of boarding. In 2004, on the initiative of Senator Nunn and a nuclear threat initiative, a very substantial study was performed of the issue of launch and warning. This allowed us to develop a draft executive agreement on renunciation of launch and warning. I presented this draft to the security council of the Russian federation. Every year from the beginning of 2004 I am giving such Senator Nunn one you know, one more copy of you know, of this document. He is probably allergic to it. So far, as we know and no real motives from the Russian leadership on this account, and the renunciation of launch or warning should be the first step towards the alerting. I I do not have much time, so I just like to say that it would be very it would be impossible to reach the final stage of nuclear disarmament without developing glo a new global system of security. When you do resolve all the problems with Iran and other threshold states it's necessary to make sure that no one fears the American conventional preponderance. It is difficult to reach and to to find all these solutions, but it is possible. A man goes you know, starting for 30 days then to it will take some 30 days to get it how to to to return to normal condition. In forty forty years, everything I did was arms racing, but I do not want to spend 40 years to return to to some normal seat. Thank you. Thank you very much. Now let us focus now on the question of reductions in nuclear forces and at the floor open for any comments to somebody who wishes to make. To the General? I I you outlined the compromise with the United States would have to do, for the for the compromising beyond the and what Russia would have to do, and there was a part where the translator left the sentence dangling, could you repeat it? On the U.S. side not to develop more than one ballistic missile defense Site yeah, site, and not to rush the deployment of 10 interceptors in Poland. Russia should agree to the American proposal that the join day to exchange center in Moscow, and the two radars that Russia offer, the Kabala radar, and the radar in Armavir will work together, one system with a radar to be de to be deploy with the system with a site to be developed and in Poland and in Czech Republic. But also on the global basis, that is also with the site in Alaska. In in fact the Armavir and Kabala radar would join the U.S. global. It seemed to me, the really interesting thing is that is the detail of it, but the possibility that the United States and Russia might start some sort of collaborative effort in on missile defenses, in such a way that the defense system did not become an obstacle to reductions, which is done unilaterally Comments on David's paper and the reduction list? In David's paper and in General's comments and Rose's paper as well, while we get to that there is a real asymmetry it seems to me and the changing on American strategic thinking on this issue being the reduce and now just focusing on him the the two papers today, and Russian strategic thing, and Senator Nunn, you said quite rightly that, what you are up at has done in your ideas has opened up and allowed a lot of interesting strategic thinking in this country. I would also say it has given cover to a lot of you know, junior neophyte foreign policy presidential candidates to sign on to say, you know, these guys are saying it, I endorsed them. When I look at the Russian side, I first do not see this this proliferation of ideas General Dvorkin and Alexander Biletop I think are leading the path, but but but they are not there it is a small path, I think Rose you will agree with me right? People are lining up to say, this is a brilliant idea we need to get on. And second political people in Russia are also not doing that. The parliamentary elections and the presidential candidates, they are not signing up and saying I endorsed the your idea, or or at similar kind of Russian idea. So, the question is why, and I think there are three reasons that I I would warrant or comment you to help us understand. Why it could be just it is not a priority to Russia right now, they got other problems, two it could be, and that is good because I really changed. Two it could be they are just frustrated with the Americans and and and attention that President Bush has given to this issue with Putin and they are just saying to hell within that, and that that would be a good sign, because that is also something I could have changed easily, and George maybe you or Henry or others who have meet the president and about this might want to comment on that, but three it could be that, by doing this, it actually changes Russia's position geopolitically geostrategically and geopolitically in the world. That is when we go to 500 or 1,000 nuclear weapons, we have all kinds of other pieces of power that makes us feel you know, a world global super power. General Abizaid I heard you speak about this before. When the Russians do it, suddenly they look a lot more like the Chinese and a lot less especially. And if that third motivation is why you do not see the rush behind this idea, that is actually a much bigger problem for how one goes forward with with the agendas in place you would set up. So, how then from both those of you who are living in Russia or are you thinking about these from these things I I would really be interested. Yeah. Let me make a a comment. I think I have been in Russia for the last month. I have heard quite a lot of skepticism about the op ed piece about, and it is partly I think, that this is not a but, and you are right. It has been a matter of wide public debate. That is partly I think because that is not at the center of Russian politics at the moment, it is not a central issue. Secondly I think the reason element of anti-Americanism and the skepticism about a a proposal like this and part of it goes to General Dvorkin's point that you know, at you if you are getting rid of nuclear weapons, you need a global security system that removes the fear from other states of American conventional preponderance. Thirdly, there may be some element it is these are not mutually exclusive factors of a commitment for superpower status, but actually I am skeptical about that argument, because it seems to me the focus of Russia's greatness now is not in nuclear weapons, it is in other areas that are really where the government is is concentrating, and where the society is concentrating. I do not so I think, I do not conclude from the relative Russian silence on this, in terms of public debate. I do not conclude that this means that the first steps could not be taken and in fact I think there is there have been over the past few years enough Russian proposals to indicate in fact a good deal of interest, and moreover, if the great one Russian fear is that the U.S. is out to get strategic nuclear superiority over Russia, which certainly reflected in public debates, then actually this is a process that could remove that fear from Russia by setting limits on strategic forces and affect leading to reduction. So I in fact see perhaps a considerable fundamental Russian interest in in this process. Going going all the way is very difficult, and I think that is why I made the argument about stages and consolidation and reassessment and stages. Part of it is that it is because, if the process gets on the way it will or should have some politcal affect, which may feed back in to the feasibility of the later stages. Moreover, I think it is politically context apparent and I agree with General Dvorkin's comment, and in the end to get rid of the weapons, we have to have a new way of handling you know, the the danger of war, and or the danger of breakout from a non-nuclear system, and that will require new institutions, something we would characterize in some way as a new security system. So that is part of the reason why I think it makes sense to focus on a possible or feasible first stage, but to think through what might be required in in later stages. This is what I call at the moment, the lack of a dance partner problem, and I think it is more serious a bit than than David laid out in that there has been an accumulation now of of Russian statements worth regard to withdrawing from a number of the cold war era, arms reduction, and control treaties, but conventional forces in Europe treaty has been very much in the press and that is on an urgent basis. The Russians intend to stop implementing that agreement in December, but the INF treaty, which general Dvorkin is also very much on the chopping block I believe. So there is a whole kind of leadership rush now on the direction away from some of the key strategic, not strategic but arms controlled treaties of the cold war era. I do see a glint of hope in the fact as again Vladimir mentioned that there is interest in the next stage as strategic arms reductions, how that will be handled. So I I think we have a situation that is not hopeless, but I did not want to bring at everybody's attention today that the leadership in Russia is at a much different place than we are on these issues. It just under scores the point that might but fall made, and it will take some serious work to bring them to the table to talk with us at the same level on these issues. And first and foremost I think my tactic has been to refer to their historic leadership on these issues, both on Soviet era and in the Russian era. I think it is possible to make an appeal to their historic leadership just as at the Reykjavik Summit, but throughout the whole period since the negotiation of the nonproliferation treaty but it is it is a rough patch and we do have a problem with our dance partner at the moment. I would like to offer an observation and to suggest. The observation is to take a broad historical perspective on what has happened in the United States-Russia relationship and their attitudes towards military forces. The United States made decisions during World War II in the second half of 1942 and on nearly 1943 to design a certain kind of posture towards armed forces to win that war, and then it stayed with that approach for 50 years. It basically made the decision site their linked set of decisions mainly in the second half of 1942. At first we are going to build much smaller ground force than we originally in vision. At first there is called the 90 division gamble. Second we are going to rely heavily on strategic air power and technology to off set those weaknesses. And third that we are also been proceed to build an atomic bomb. The decision to great Manhattan district and make big money bets were made in the second half of the 1942. For 50 years we are basically a country that assumed that had a relatively small army and it compensated with big fire power, including the heavier lines on nuclear weapons. We now find ourselves a country that has the most powerful army in the world, and which nuclear weapons now no longer made geopolitical sense to us, just a profoundly right judge on those, but please notice the attitudes of Russia in contrast to that. A country that historically relied on overwhelmingly large ground forces as the key to its national security and that now confronts the flipside of that enormous reversal that I have just described. I think, by the way this perception is implicit for almost all of us, we all understand it. My observation is, I think there is a value to making this observation explicit, because it then puts on the agenda to the need to address the Russian side of that equation in a more explicit way, and that brings me to my suggestion, it is how do you address the Russian concerns about their strategic posture in this entirely new world we live in, and here I basically agree that most of the papers were sound, so I am mostly concerned with, how would I put this agenda in the practice that the secretary of state asked me to do that in an international and political context. And my agenda for the Russians would have probably three parts. The first part is, increase their confidence in the adequacy of their conventional forces, you have to have an agenda to increase their confidence in the adequacy of their conventional forces both at West and East. Rose Gottemoeller clearly sees this and the first key aspects of this in her paper in the European context. Notice for the Russian is not the issue of the adequacy of their conventional forces vis a vis NATO and the United States. They were also looking at the adequacy of their conventional forces, vis a vis China in the long haul. So then you basically have an agenda that works on how to sell the preposition that their conventional forces would be adequate. And one valuable piece of this is if the Russians thought that we actually cared about that problem, and wanted to engage them on it in this kind of receptive way that alone would be a very powerful message and a positive message to the Russian government. The second part of the agenda is you have to give them and work with them on a new doctrine counter WMD. In other words, It is not sufficient to have a negative state, which is you no longer need deterrence of the old cold war con. We have always agreed on that. Actually a lot of Russians probably agree on that, where there is a lot of anti-American at spirits now, but you can not just make a negative argument, you have to make a positive argument is what are the major WMD threats to Russian security and what is the doctrine that counters it? I think here there is a case that can be made is how Russia can best off set the risks, from nuclear developments in countries like Iran, or other countries that they may fear, but you have to work with them to develop a positive doctrinal answer to that question, not just to rely on making the argument that the old cold war arguments are no longer valid. That is true just to counter with something to take its place, and by the way I think here are the key element in that answer is Russian confidence that they will be a partner in what ever global strategy we have in which we think we are going to counter WMD threats in a non nuclear world. If they think they are an essential partner with the Americans in that global security condominium or whatever you want to call it. That itself will make a big difference. The third dimension I think is to address the missile issue in a cooperative way, and here I though General Dvorkin's suggestions are a very constructive start for further discussion, it may be that these are just tentative suggestions as to how to presume, but they are just waste of try to test the fundamental problem that the whole Russian attitude on armed forces is now different from what it was from most of our professional loss, and we have to exquisitely understand that, and then construct an explicit agenda for how to address that Russian concern in the way that goes beyond just the issues of America and make it. Going to the part from the order of the list that I had and Henry wanted to speak and then there has been so much discussion about what Russia's point of view is, we have had two Russians in the room so we might hear from them what they think the Russian point of view is on these things so, Henry and then General Dvorkin had brought. Let me let me make an observation of my assessment of what the Russian leaders that I know, what did I talked to seemed to think about some of these about some of these problems. I agree with what Michael said about the three interpretations that are brought. It seems to me that when I have to begin in assessing Russian leaders thinking would lead the leaders that I know enough of this from from the realization that they have a need for the definition of an identity in a country that has lost 300 years of its history, and then it is now back and it is folded at where it started under Peter the Great. That is a significant psychological assessment. What is a what we we want to be a major country, we have always wanted to be a major country. We started out being a major country, and we went through 300 years of foreign adventures, wars, and we had brought back to where we started in terms of that means it is very important that they feel they are treated with some respect, and one of the irritating aspects of American policy in many administrations is that we started with the assumption that we have the answer, we then judge other countries by giving them tests, let me say, your answer to this question shows your adequacy in dealing with the international systems, and then we are already in a confrontation before we even elaborate it. I said I do not believe that for Russia, the nuclear issue now is the dominant issue, it is the ironic reversal of the situation that they have now have our strategy of if they have any of World War or after World War II. The dominant trouble may how do you conduct a foreign policy in a country, that has vast for this, to which one they have to fill geopolitically insecure, which have a chance? That is a fact of life when you have 30 million people on side and a billion on the other and recently acquired territory. On the other they have on another order they have a hostile ideology that undermines the structure of the Russian state. And on the third order where we Americans would say okay that is fine, it is the best. But they are there are states before Russia. It it is historically very difficult to accept and simply and understand like the Ukraine. I am not saying that it is right, I am just trying to say here it is the psychological problem to remind you, Russian leaders face and and before we can get That would could really the beginning of the 18th century and a lot of Russian blood has been and the religion came from here it is so we thought of when we talk of Ukraine and they thought, that is a psychological challenge, that is not a military challenge alone. So in other words Russia is about back when it always has been with no secured border in its man. So its it is what we have to understand with respect to the to to the dialog, now at the same time I believe that no matter what the act what criticism is being met by moment at this moment of the United States, I believe it is to tell you to a negotiation, it is not to tell you to a confrontation. I think it is to establish national credentials during the election period and it will lead to a negotiation after, but then the question is whether we are going to negotiate to that. On the other side, I do not have a side. We have no time to cover it out we got to talk about that later in the day, but I think the dialog I would start was rather, if I could write the script would be the same, why can not we talk to each other about the dangers what is the political evolution to be foreseen in to the what do we think is going to happen, and how do we assess the dangers and opportunities that arise out of them, and I believe if we did that we would find a considerable parallel of use, and I would use that then to go in to the arms collection, rather and we all did consider that in our discussions here, rather than hop to them and say you have 10 things you should do to use strategic order. I would be I think we should do something in the courses but first I would try to restore a common dialog and to avoid that feeling on the resting side that we have been condescending and on outside that we are just seeing another version of Russian imperialism. This is the problem I as I see is. Thank you Henry. Well here from our Russian friends Henry. You are still a Russian you know. Thank you, I am agreeing. I think that Dr. Kischinger drew the picture of the challenges to Russian security and doing much better fashion than Russian leaders managed to do. I think there is all you know, it would be a great idea for you to to make a broadcast on the first channel number 1 of the Russian state television. I am convinced that it will not be difficult at all to negotiate a reduction to 1,500 nuclear warheads now. The key thing is for American negotiators not to say "oh it is our idea", but to say "we are just accepting your old idea that you know" president Yeltsin raised before other political attributes, or president Putin talked about 1,500 warheads, we finally agree. This little really would fit Russia's economic capabilities. The principal that no problems with transparency and verification. Start one has such a great complex of verification and transparency means that one can simply you know, use it to fish out whatever you need. One could find there the types of verification that would for example fit UK, France, or Chinese. You know, they may agree in a voluntary manner you know, so to fill in unilateral manner to something like this. Both or some are American, and some Russian expert enormously think that reductions to 1,000 warheads and below increase effectiveness of ballistic missile defense. If the structure of strategic nuclear forces provides for that survivability, the 1,000 warheads could be more effective than larger force, and I can mathematically show that. Thank you. You know, I I would be a little bit embarrassed to represent my self as a Russian since I left so long ago, easier to represent as a soviet. So, what I would like to to say, I think it is important to remember here at this gathering this missile defense issue is the eye, goes a show stopper in Reykjavik and it was not so difficult later to persuade but you have to change his view, but what goes missing in the Reykjavik something, this could provide fray saving for for that show, I think I agree completely with General Dvorkin that now we reach the situation in on the issue of missile defense. When a simple face saving could be really helpful several years ago I had a chance to speak briefly with President Putin and the first question I ask to him is why he is opposing cooperation and missile defense. It was long before the Shibrahian, the contemporary issue, and his reaction was really remitted. He said that he is not against Catherasian he said, but we have our our own vision how it should be structured, and we want it to be here by Americans. I think it is indication was really simple that we need deeply respect and for the Russian side, it is very important to have a respect you know, and then to have wide capacity to Russians always would try to remind respect me, it is it is not in there precisely. And I think the suggestion of more simple compromise of about Kabala station and some American restrained in quickly moving in Europe probably would be sufficient, especially now when we need some simple example of good feelings between two sides to move further, and there are already some positive implications maybe some of you noticed I think it was a couple of months ago, one of the meetings between and the simple statement which was released that both agreed that two countries should work on achieving agreement on reducing nuclear weapons arsenals to minimal possible level, of course we all wonder what this is to guise consider as their minimal possible level, is it 1,000 as David Holloway was talking today, or 1,500? This is very important to pursue, but at least this already is somehow in the agenda of the conversation. I was I went to Moscow after our first meeting here ago, this extremely enthusiastic ideas that I will convey to Russians such a tremendous breakthrough here at the first meeting hosted by and I spoke of his members nation security council, and they were extremely cold. They said you know our situation have changed, Americans rejected any thing which was coming from us during the last 10 or 15 years, and you finally be decided that we will join the concept of Margaret Thatcher that nuclear weapon saved is a world from World War III and it it is a real difficult issue, but all these views are mostly among military characters like general the chief of general staff. I do not think on the political level that is much thinking of what is done about the nuclear disarmament in Russia and it is very important that we have a chance to reeducate them, but we need the first positive step, as an indication that Putin is not playing much research for further development of nuclear weapons, I I think since we do not have press here I hope the presence of is also confidential. I was told recently an interesting story, who was here, he left. He has been many times also visiting major Russian nuclear weapon center, which was called in the heart of Europe's and the story I heard recently that the average salary overseas closed city of nations today is below median salary over, you can see it in worker regions of region of about 10,000,000 people's eyes so that is obviously indications that work is not the highest priority of Putin's administration. I also know that Putin who has taught about this inequality, this balance. He said that we will think something and two years past since last conversation and nothing changed. I think it is a good sign a good indication that the Russian Government's heart is not wth in nuclear things but I think Sam Nunn should worry that it might create a completely different undesirable consequence destabilize his community and control of what they have in a this are nuclear materials. Thank you. Thank you, let me just kind of object. I come at least on my on behalf here did I see what we are trying to do in this project is to set up this vision as Max has said. And then as carefully and thoroughly as we can explore the individual steps that you have to take if you going to get there in any confident way and as we get that better and better in hand, then we hope by the end of this conference we will feel reasonably good about that. Then, we are on a much better position to say to people in Russia, in the United States or else where. Here is a program that is doable that you can see what steps you need to take that are concrete and operational and it need to be done. And on such a basis, I hope that leaders might engage themselves in doing this and I would to say given the reality of where all the nuclear weapons are, its that's really set the principle. The job start with the United States and Russia and if the United States and Russia are ready to be serious about this, than this, I think David said probably the sooner other people are involved the better. But anyway, the starting has to be with this two countries now and we are trying to build a base that can be helpful on that regard. May I think that as we do this we got two and three doubtful people to to pay for the evolution of global Olympics global evolution so that we can relate the teaching the others to political views and that we don't that to look like arms controllers from the Cold War period who think the patriot limiting numbers you are going to resolve. Just if that we can describe what are the considerable changes, challenges that anybody will face. And then we can bring the specifics at some point into relation with other knowledge's if we can generate. I think that would be very helpful Henry and I'll volunteer to take notes as you described your thoughts on that. ___ paper. George Shultz, on Henry's thought I agree with that and I agree what John Vaulken has said and laid out and his comments about Kessenger's comment so, having said that I think at some point we have to put the security of Europe on the table and that goes along with what Henry is saying. I do not think you construct a security arrangement in Europe that is sustainable politically or militarily without the Russians to being included and we tried that with partnership for peace but that didn't last very long in a sense of real viability. We have all sorts of intervening events including the Belle Gray bumping and so forth cause Kosovo we have got a lot of thing returning about we heard from Rose about INF and also the conditional forces. In spite of all of this and in spite of everybody including President Bush and John Kerry saying that preventing nuclear terrorism was the most fundamental security issue we faced and in spite the fact everybody I believe thanks about we realized that Russia has to be a part of that equation whether that's number one or number two on our list and in spite of the fact we haven't even talked about biological and this is a none biological conference and I won't get off into that but that is going to be huge problem in the future and Russia is a key to that too. In spite of all that, here we are in a body politic left and right talking about taking in Georgia and Ukraine and the __ now you know there is something badly out of whack if we think we can really make this things priorities and do that at the same time. It just doesn't make sense but really the vacuum in the political sense is there are also lots of people for that counter expansion for their reasons some other good reasons and yet the people who are skeptical about it don't really speak out so there is a big vacuum here and it just keeps marching along and so at some point, I think we have to put the security of Europe on the table and we have to have some studies alone to what had Henry's talking about and this going to include Charlotte too at some point. There is no question is going to include Charlotte but there is a brother figure and I believe, I don't know who said it but there have been a lot of good comments this morning but someone said that I think if we show I think it was Henry, if we showed some real concern and understanding of where the Russians are coming from on their own security situation and insecurity they feel in that boarders, it would go a long way psychologically to be able to have a dollar on this, but it is totally inconsistent with the way our political system is moving in terms of left and right in this security situation. So, I think we have to put down the table or so. David, I hope you feel you're getting of a lot of ili illumination for your proposal was on how to go about reducing weaponry. But let me go down my list, I have now a Grim, Bob, I have a left over _____ Bruce will be back. I have or, have on my list, down the clock when I think what I mistaken Joe so. Correct. George, I I upload this undertaking and I think it will it help to give us the focus practically on the steps that would be require to get there is exactly correct and I think the papers would advance that conversation a long way. I was picking from Mike McFaul earlier but we need to take I think the moderators think about it is, if this vision is to be realize and if I were betting it will not be realized but if we do not to be realized what were the obstacles that prove can possible to overcome and that would be just the negative side of the positive version of the question you put. And I think two had been put on the table, one is that the Russians would not agree to it. Put that as a question, why would the rational strategic Russian agree to this opposition? And then the second possible obstacle is if General Dvorkin is correct then it seemed to me David Holloway agree with this that an order to eliminate nuclear weapon we would have to invent and entirely knew global security system which General Dvorkin said would also have to resolve what ever differences the US has with Iran for example just to kind us a country of example. And if I could say we are just about both. When Russia Henry already said much more eloquently with the idea that I would like to express. It seems he is my own professor that seems reasonable enough. I think I have talked a lot to Russians colleagues about the proposal since the four horsemen article. And if we took somebody like Andre Caucasian who is a very I know we well and whose at least part of the Putin gang. His take away or my take away from a long conversation about this would be forget about it. So that's beyond maybe too strong but I know his question would be why would a national Russian strategist agree to such a proposition. If you ask yourself strategically what country should find this most attracted are you just a Marxian strategist working at the village. You would say, a country that had overwhelming conventional profounder or dominance either would and makes nuclear weapons or a weak man's equalizer should rather this extremely attractive and I do and actually one of the arguments that sometimes made when we have done this brainstorming with Sam is why should be we Americans. We would be relatively stronger in advancing our interests, including co horsing states if we don't like what they are doing about either human rights or some other arrangement if nuclear weapons had not been invented. So, I would sign up through that world and I think you could sign up a great spectrum Americans in a way that if I were a Russian taking strategically and I looking at my weak conventional forces let us spill up jar except I would say well this seems a little bit like the reversal I mean this I I don't think that there was a proposal but there probably should have been one during the Cold War, when we thought they had a urgent divisions and we had only a few that nuclear weapon should not be deployed in Europe but we thought nuclear weapons where our weak mans equalizers. So that, the first question would be why would this rational strategic Russian as well in the obstacles or were in the problems that will have to overcome and I think that is even to become. On the second one which is an even bigger one. Do we agree with that Dvorkin proposition? That in order to eliminate nuclear weapons we have to invent the new global security system that resolves the other differences including a presumably the none nuclear weapons part of the of of the arsenal and if we do I think, I I would suspect that we do or that we got to at least addressed that set of issues but then we are in to the broader political set the questions were geopolitical questions that give me a way. From the original and then just to conclude in the original version of this and it was also in Dvorkin's paper, the NPT talks about the association of a nuclear arms raised nuclear disarmament and the treaty on general and complete and and and Mr. Dvorkin even mentioned this as well. Well, are we serious about general and complete disarmament? I mean, would say in General whenever I have thought about that before, I do not and so where are we in that space? So, two obstacles to at least identify that we need to get over in order to accomplish the objective one a rational Russian strategy's and the second one, a new global security system of coping with. Let me just interject it is interesting that as we start down the road of examining steps it has been partially impossible to talk about the first step. The reason being that soon as you start talking about there are host of other issues that immediately come to mind and that grabs your attention. I would say that there is another side of the coin Gran but we've talk about this particularly. But which is part of the motivation namely, at least as I feel, the world is kind of drifting out of control. This kind of a tipping point, where anything goes and anybody can get a whole of anything including nuclear weapons and somehow a movement doesn't start that pushes back the other direction. We are going to have a lot more chaos, it is not Russia's interest, in our interest or anybody else's interest. After all the world is in the at the in the moment, extraordinary economic expansion all over the world unprecedented. And something like this gets out of head and that is the end of it and people say well, you got to something poverty. Well I agree and this economic expansion is doing something about poverty in the big way actually. You left things get out of head and that is going down on the drain. So, you got to get started on this kind of thing it seems to me. And if we say we cannot do anything into and ready to solve everything, we will never do anything, so we got to take this steps which was I think the essence of the Wall Street article steps are keys. I got to go down my last year, Bob I think you are next. Thank you, I wanted to refer to some points it made by Dvorkin in touched on David's paper in two developments that can help United States move toward zero but make it more difficult for anybody else to follow us and we totally got missile defense and conven advance conventional arms. If we had a treaty about the nuclear weapons we have to assume that North Korea and other countries would cheat and they would have a capability to use them against us so, it would nice to have missile defense is in that eventuality but simply having this defenses well raise questions about the deference of other countries. We talked about various ways in getting over the current hunt are now deployments in Eastern Europe and really talked about some phase saving measures that the Russians may need and apparently we have approached the Russians we have talked about joint manning of centers or sharing early warning data and so forth. Those are good measures but I don't think they get at the basic Russian concern and if the US genuinely had effective defenses regardless of these rather cosmetic measures we could nullify their determining capability. The second is conventional capability. Just a few days ago a saw an article by eluding to comments by General Cartright who is now vice chairman of the joint chiefs. He was a commander of the strategic command and talk about the ability with modern advance lead US conventional forces. We could substitute for many of the of the nuclear weapons we used to meet our deterrence requirements and he believes this such a thing as a conventional deterrent and we can relay on this in the future. The problem is we are the only country in the world that can do that and as we enhance the legality of our conventional forces other countries may feel or the more incentive that they have to have nuclear weapons, so this is its is paradox and I think this group today not today but you know in the work we continue to do need to look at both this questions missile defense and conventional forces. I don't think the the jointness we have been talking about with missile defense is not going to be able to solve this problem and I think this is a real obstacle and I think in the end you not going to be able to overcome these issues with technical fixes. I think the only way you can overcome that is the kind of proposals and ideas that have been discussed today which is to get ourselves in the Russians in the kind of strategic relationship. We will no longer see each other since strategic threats. So, I try to yeah, I will try to comment briefly on the Russian decision and I will stand with the bit of a good news I think it's very good to see that the kind of proposal of missile defense got duration and the that doing a work and describe, that is actually giving support not just in this room but from the US administration as well. I think that the other day Robert Gates secretary of the defense mention that the actually the United States might be willing to postponed the deployment of those rangers that goes in Poland's if Russia will be willing to battle and to include radars into overall system. So they are now demolished on the Russian headquarters and I certainly hope and that would be a very interesting test if the question that you might be to what extend Russia actually the problem is that Russia feels vulnerable and the least that this kind of nuclear disbarment will eventually bring it into inferior position and we and we will see on the surface of it appears that Russian does feel vulnerable and this explains to some extent the lack of interest the relatively or actually hostile of reaction of the idea of going to zero in Russia. At the same time the its very clear I think why this has happens because what Rose describe there is lack of kind of a dancing partners of with the without the engagement without any kind of real dialogue within United States, what your see in Russia is that old national security is defined of quite people how actually do not have interest and they don't have a stake and disbarment or engagement and instead they have a stake in confrontation and this kind of proper and visual referee. For whatever reasons whether it's a political or whether it is the industry trying to get through itself into a stronger position. So, in this kind of atmosphere when Russia is sort of allowed to if you want to define in security this way, there is no surprise that we hear from people had percussion that this is Russia would be crazy to agree to arguments unlike then. But here I think we should really look at the -- what happens with the Reykjaivk and the process in the end is not how it happen exactly. And I think the lesson from that was that the government of the United States of the time of the Reagan administration to engage with the Soviet Union and actually to suggest an alternative way of deal with security issue other than just building up more missiles. That was actually the key and basically what happened was the United States held the Soviet Union the time define its national security in terms different thing just pure confrontation and eventually that was successful and I think that's what what we should keep in mind what is possible today in their regard I think the key to addressing whatever concerns Russia may have. It is actually try to engage the tradition whether its negotiated as our nuclear disarmament whether it is a new treaty. There are people who are interested in doing that in Russia whether its missile defense aberration, there are people who are into this and by engaging them you would create the kind of people who could define national security in different terms. You will change the environment, you change the relationships and that will eventually make very daring proposals possible in Russia so I'm very optimistic on that regard but I think the engagement is to be able to be work here and they should keep that in mind. Thank you. John I'm going to close the book and then we will have a break after seven. I maybe joining a course here I think but briefly pick-up on some of the comments quickly those of Dr. Kissinger make three points. I came back from Russia in August. Low level on sanitary sampling here but my sense was that 300 years of history have been lost maybe more. What Russia is looking for in the world two things and important role and respect and the cope whatever his faults is trying to redefine Russia in it. Russia, unconsciously getting in to that ground, I did have to sense that nuclear weapons are much in the forth rank of peoples thinking though they are taking for grated as part of the world work. Not then anyone lets get rid of them it is just not does not a comment that they used to have. Second, strikes me that we are talking about here probably a single biggest and most complicated idea about farm policy with anyone put on the table in the last decades. At one level, it fears to be finite talking about this in nuclear weapons but obviously in kind of papers and our discussion the consequences of the sudden impact to politics. And it is beyond the comprehension of most people who haven't read these papers who have rather thought to start by talking to them about let's rid the nuclear weapons. You get the reaction that Iran is hear and why would we want to do that. Its really the implications of getting rid of them that are first class so that tells me the second point is, this is really enforcing you know what would the would saying. We need to have a dialogue with the Russians that goes to 30,000 figure about what is going on with the world and can we see it in some mutually agreeable term. Now we will try to do that unless we would try to do it. We all know how hard it is. Talking back to the 90's when we were deeply engage with them we always went with an agenda and we always went with the list of issues. Lets talk today about your support to Iran and how we don't like that, lets talk today about are worry about in Iran. This always where we define life and we wont this, you know how hard it is to get a common view of problems in the world at strategic level. But then I think is where we need to start rather going to them and saying in the first instance, "let's go down to a thousand weapons or lets start taking things off of alert" that will bring out all the impulse that we don't want to bring out, we got to start at the general level. And in our own country we have to push against the idea I think that Russia is not in support with that issue. And in good terms it isn't put on this issue with it. But the idea if you ask the average American about foreign policy of the average elite, foreign policy specialist you are going to hear the China rising. Its true but does not going to help us with this problems in the first instance we got to overcome that and give the 30,000 feet with the Russians with all the frustrations that we will involve. Third point, someone you wanted the papers and instruct me as procedure in absolutely in vital idea and picking up on George Shultz's observation that politically we may have to wait for the next administration. Someone is going to wake after one morning worrying only about this. A new administration will have that still but people buying to this idea at a visionary level. There will have to be someone who works this issue every single day and wakes up worrying about it the way it say Dennis Ross wake up worrying about the Middle East. I don't know what that means in NSC director subject of special but it will require I think that kind of attempt. I do remember in sure relationship to your remarks and in the course of our negotiations when I was in the office. Particularly, I remember one session in the Kremlin when we had a little break and I was I talked with Mr. Gorbechav and said we get together and we have all this issues that we have above but there is something happening in the world that has nothing to do with his issues it is going to affect you and it is going to affect us and we never talk about and its implications are. Unless this gigantic information that is coming at this with all the associated computers and internets and so in Mr. Mendez implications. And he was very interested and we had big project and Deck Solomon run a good part of that. We had stock meeting and so on. And you are suggesting what we need to do more this only underlines, Henry suggested that we try to include somehow in this complex of papers. Accepting that addresses the global network as we try to piece it together in the boarder sense. Next I have James. Global outwork is nice queue. I'm want to try a different tract of paradigm phrase, and to consensus I heard a lot of those "lets be nice to the Russians, lets respect them, lets bring them in, lets be kind, lets solve their feelings, give them respect." And I have two questions of promise with Russians. One is, when Henry Kissinger, I learn don't confuse politics with psychiatrists or find a doctor. Actually, it is treaty somebody is a patient has it but within adjustment of interest. And the second question I have is further, this adjustment of interest that the we are talking about is possible in this particular phase where we have to meet with the relationship. Where I think the two countries are two different pages or two different faces of the development or self or self perfection. Well, if I were a Russian, setting at Moscow what would see here, over here. I would see enough space at the moment of its maximum self doubt maximum weakness and towards on its advance but it cannot win Afghanistan, and then go on, a third they not fight which is wrong. The Afghanistan and Iraq saw it, third when there are no fight and so and a great loss of legitimacy for this current administration when I get around the world. So, why? Where was I? I look at myself and I said no, I am doing a lot better than my partners and still get my tax in that past. I'm on the raw and friends we could all do, that Russia is now the kind of revisionist. Revisionist of tact of course where is trying to get to regain whether it's lost or take revenge for 15 years of humiliations, either imagine or real at the hands or the worse. And why they has their feeling it is doing very well in restoring the balance. I mean, I think I think and once they are doing that I don't think they are ready to assume what the French of responsibility. I am endlessly puzzled by Russian behavior these are be one. We thought that the great power of the nuclear should link with United States and private for the proliferation. Instead it is it has been sabotaging out productions, I guess it will. Instead Putin us kind of in the 21'st century where they says that it has been serous on this in this rangers moved in the force shall be applied. This pain exquisite skill which I think both game in Russia and Russians informed and it is doing beautiful and the is part of that thing. If that again will hop to desired eloquence from the Americans so, how it could involved in the force. We spend to cooling and hauling sacks, I'm on that and I am happy and that is to rerise and revenge myself for giving the task 15 years and with addition to that 12 years Henry mention well, we are just good. I mean free on the years of expansion they are suddenly ended at Christmas day of 1991 with the Soviet Union see it as a Soviet time. Another question is this jaundiced counter consensus of view of mine is in trouble if Russia is in a low. How much kind of they achieve we are not respect and kindness and friendliness and treating it is always been, that is enough with. They pretend to be victims of their fears recently the west and always in return to have struck fear into the west that the west truly felt. It is an older completely psychological thing. So what if I'm back? Thank you. And now we begin with that and I know the resentment that Joe Geoffrey has just said almost precisely, what I wanted to say that I do have this small variation of this and what is being discussed here will be achieve within a reasonable time frame and what exactly is in the time frame. You have added toward Russia seems to be changing in some ways of structure and material ways especially as Russian energy dominance from the horizon. The ability of the Russian and the success of the Russians recently in achieving control of means and deliver and vital they needed energy of resources to Western Europe and to Eastern Europe indeed. That lines with it particularly has grow eventually. So, these transmission lines become incredibly important part of shaping the Russian attitude to ward its own capabilities in the near future. So, would the Russians consider it even worthwhile at this time, when I this time I don't mean this moment but within the frame of the next 18 months to proceed and one answer maybe probably not given the palace state of prestige of the United States and the capability of the United States to be at one mind. Given the partnership that divides the congress from the administration the inability to see in any ability to get anything done on the a parts of basis so why not wait then until November and at that point we don't want to convert this conference into something like takes in the consideration every political and economic aspect as a props or as a barrier cause a negative considerations that deprive to achieve caution in the process is consolidate in his power. And in any event, every reasonable observer expects that Russia will not change after its own elections and the fruits must still be at the drivers set in the some prospective establish in the strategic goals with the same to complete the same crew that he has now. It was on our side of new administration in inevitable in January of 2009 leaves six months at a very minimal to get anything done. In 1969 Henry and the security counsel directed the review of everything, all policies and it might reasonably expects that a new administration of another party for example it would demand a similar review of every major crown policy consideration and judgment thereby requiring 6-8 months that puts you well into the full at the end of 2009. Even assuming what a new administration could with the team capable of doing that unless the proposals and propositions had been carefully thought out in advance. That is a pleasant undermine the essential worth of what being achieve this discussions and the ability or the attempt to come together on basic propositions that might form part of the programmatic approach to these problems by a new administration. But it does seem to me also to underscore the urgency of completing some aspect of this work in time to present to parties both parties by the time of the election and certainly by the time of the transition and the new administration. Certain specific recommendations for consideration that could be rejected or accepted the level of thinking could be done in advance this way. It's a critical period, on the Russian side I just like to make know that on the USA. Its possible that putting things is and we will see and we will then react the way we reacted people and we will try to prevent it. But I would think that a Russian leader who makes an unsentimental assessment above the sources of Russian strength cannot go to challenge the whole world with the declining population heals issue on this population a close of a Muslim population can pick it from here with Russia and with China and if they could have this course, if they couldn't do it when they are with the Soviet Union? How can they possibly succeed doing it from the current phase and they collapse and they we would have to worry about the disintegration of Russia. So, I would think that a rational Russian analysis would be to use this period for a negotiation. And then thought that I think that is what they are trying to do, not a add that the sentimental reason. Secondly, why don't they wait until a new administration transition? That's a perfectly rational approach and looking at the debate in Russia today both within the administration and between the administration of the congress. That would be a very sensible thing to do. On the other hand, you could make this argument. If there is a new president and he tries to engage into a major negotiation, first you will have to spend six months getting this administration organize. At least, so when you don't negotiate now, you are not negotiating for nearly two years. Secondly, the case to be made for the proposition, if they assume they go up with church and Vatican's there are no even if the republic and stay it will be a different kind of preference. It is not desirable to anyone who negotiates with us. To begin the negotiation in the period of intense American domestic controversy about the negotiation so, if the principle of comprehensive negotiation could be establish before if that's would the Russian would want. It would be easier to conclude it in a by part that is in the way. If it is not a totally new advancement, I mean, I'm keeping you the argument that you could make in Russia and by with this that some are coming. And to wait and see I would intently apply that also so Iraq. I think it would be if there are any Iran's that want the side of something they better off starting it this administration than waiting for a new administration, but that is a different issue. I could see the hate a cold blood Russian national into this analysis could lead them flexing their muscles for a while. Scarring people and then after which maddest to them because it will determine the influence of the United Russia party over the next four years in some way but after that we will off this. That is my I expected we are heading into the period of the. I agree with that and not ask. And I associate it anyways, I said before we are trying to put into place the building blocks that you need and whenever anybody is ready we should be ready and I think general is working rightly point to that you have at the end of the 2009. The expiration of the treaty that contains all of the application that been so pains taking the work out and it would be criminal to let that go by, so the sooner the paper can get going to something like that the better and pass that long. And I believe also at least as I interpreted the spirit of our conversations as we worked on this problem, we said to ourselves this is not a by part as an effort so much this is not part of celebrity. That is we like to take this subject and say that there is a point in discussion play to argue about but not for the sake of part of advantage other but to advance the subject along. Excuse me Sam. Just 10 seconds of hope here because we do have to get to the vision they are all enormous numbers I think it have to be done. I think that is the way our conversation has going on because it has been very relevant. But in terms of steps, we are already working with Russia on nuclear materials _____ I won't get any further. We have been working on that for 12 years and we had made a lot of progress. We already working with Russia on the fuel cycle. who is going to address that. Jimbee is right in the middle of all of that. We are making some progress on that. There is some hope on that and is crucial to stop a bill of right and enrichment we already engage with Russia on the verification. The question of how much we extend the start one verification and that is going to have to be done in this administration. And we are beginning to top with Russia in missile defense so those are four crucial steps that are already in the wheel on the way with Russia. Or we have an opportunity in the next 18 months. Back in 2000 and 2001 we led US- Russian joint stuff talks and it was very very clear to me that the Russian military believe that the equation producing the arsenal plus missile defense was all design to diminish their power. In 2001 after the bombings on September 11, the chief of this delegation who is now the chief of the general stuff clearly recognize that their will be a need for military moved into central Asia which he regarded and convey the may would be okay if it was temporary but not okay if it was long term. Today, when you look at the Russian military position they have a problem with US military power conventionally. They have a US military basing system that is developed on their central Asian door steps they have sort of military activity take in place in the Caspian sea to a limited to degree no doubt that reason that have put in the Caspian rivers knot. And from narrow standpoint, there is enormous pressure from the United States that is designed to diminish Russian power and that has to be address comprehensively Diminish Russian power and that has to be address comprehensively. Its very interesting to them that they cant seem to find common cause on the problem of the confrontation of Islamic discriminism when they think that the problem in judgment and the problem in Afghanistan and with Alkaida in the World War they will win and so I cant see how you can make this personally. If the US-Russian arsenal is down without really have an a comprehensive attack on the entire relationship. That includes American military presence in Central Asia that the relationship with regards of the global war on terror energy movements throughout the Asian land mass. Inventional force reduction etcetera so, it would seem to me that we have to approach this comprehensively otherwise we will be out of stands now. George your original motivation for convening all this time of the year ago was to deal with the existential threat brought on by the threat of terrorist with nuclear weapons and real national proliferation programs and this we have been creating revisiting the broader context in which in a such moves with her and identify in certain preck and this in prerequisites that with very good sense including the psychohistorical context in Russia today. What we put out with mike is that the existential trend are to continue to motivate this work and perhaps as we will discuss tomorrow involved at least brought thing to other countries in South Asian in particular. But hat is not necessarily inconsistent with undertaking this boarder sense of a US-Russian dialogue on how together we can contribute to refashioning global system for at least for resolution of disputes but is compose has just said. Well, how do you both things? I think given our own political context chair in the pack of the ability to do anything the next 18 months the principle of this group are were already to play and that is to acknowledge the very, very impressive work that has been done and another article perhaps two and three and four. Which would send a signal to Russia as well as to the American people that would illuminate the nature of the world we live in and establishing a road map isn't described with the term but a series of progressions through which we can together both US and Russia as well as with the parties involved in proliferation today can began to enlighten to both concrete steps that are presented in this very good papers but realize that they haven't been reoccur intermittently over a long long time in which your brother over arching new architecture of the peaceful resolution of this piece has to be put in place and that is really the power of the four people commenting upon this and continuing to do so, given as subordinates carry on the work with people of who are active players in this problem. You let decide to with Jorge always and we have that the steps to building blocks were very important and its true that the way where the world is now, no one sees a path very far a head to get into zero. But I would like to go back and we know that the discussion here the building blocks instead of what is the first step and we somehow we took on the cosmic scale on some nuclear physicist I want to get that to reports. I mean for example, if we are going to reduce, begin begin reducing waters to a 1000 or 1500 well, what are the stages that are possible that make sense given now for trying improve the climate for the progress. What are the criteria we are going to judge these steps by. Now David in his paper listed criteria regarding stability in deterrence as it is now. Building transparency and with not we have talked about that at all and I really would like to before we leave tomorrow afternoon also look at the scale because its going to be the trust and the understanding built up by each one in these little steps starting at the first one that has to create a climate that we receptive for our goal and ambition so are we just asking this now if we spelled and quit they do that is the whole David's wonderful paper does anybody had problem with the way he has formulated how did he find that bacteria and instead of steps to make progress which are we just as soon as the life of the discussion means that is the redo or we move on. Well we will move on to a break. But I was hurting that Sam describes the things that are actually going on. It reminds me of that Q and A why does the Frenchman kiss the ladies hand? He has to start somewhere. We take maybe 10 minutes break and then we will comeback to Bruce paper on the alerting.