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Well, it's good to be here. It feels like, you know, like - like home. That is from time to time I shop in Miami for something or I know that and eventually perhaps like many of us will eventually decamp here at the end of at least for part of my career. What I want to do I am assuming by the way on the basis of what (Lina) told me and the communication we have had that you have had a chance to read the book or read at least some of the chapters. So since I saw that it would be without that to touch especially since it's a book published in the early 90s and a great deal has happened since then. From time to time I have that ambition of doing a new version of CD on that. Much of much of what I do now as an old man is revisiting myself. So I usually, they let the article that Bruce mentioned on Latin America and class structures, its a revisiting of one published back in 1985, it's a new version. I haven't got anything to do with that book, but this is the closest that I have come and I wanted to share it with you a - where is the other microphone. This is the closest that I have come and I wanted to share with you part of my more more recent analysis of what use of what you have read and for discoursing the book on the on the construction of a Cuban enclave here and what happened afterwards in terms of the literature. In 1980 - with a former student, Kenneth Wilson, we published an article in the American Journal Sociology that identified the ethnic enclaves as a distinct form of economic adaptation. These formations were characterized by special concentration of immigrants who organized a variety of enterprises to serve their own life as well as the general population The substantial portion of workers of the same nationality are employed in these terms and their founding of an idea of manufacturing and commercial sectors. In that paper we made three claims. First that the enclave was a distinct economic sector separate from primary and secondary sectors of the mainstream economy. Second that the economic pay off for human capital brought from the home country was higher in the enclave than in the sectors of the mainstream economy that employed most immigrant labor. And third that enclave entrepreneurs receive higher economic returns than co-ethnics that had comparable human capital even when the later were employed in sectors of the mainstream economy. We provided empirical evidence in that AJS article on the basis of in the basis of a data from a sample of Cuban exiles who arrived in the United States in the early 1970s and were followed throughout the decade. It turns out that this this turnout to be a popular paper and the enclave hypothesis garnered the attention at the time, I think that in part because it ran country to conventional sociological and economic wisdom. That wisdom what argue that that the ethnic economies and ethnic enterprise are based on employer last resort with distinct disadvantages read out as to entrance into a mainstream sectors of the American economy. At worst they were characterized as mobility traps confining immigrant and ethnic minorities to a condition of permanent disadvantage. We took the opposite that in a later book called 'Latin Journey' published in 1985 - doing a compare that data comparative analysis of employment and income on among Cuban and Mexican immigrant males in the late 1970s. The results went beyond those reported earlier by focusing on the terminus what lead to become what lead people to become entrepreneurs in an ethnic enclave using the same data that that was on and I have used before, we found that the principle determinants of self employment among Cubans in Miami were parental human capital, allocation and most importantly having been employed in a co-ethnic firm themselves as a part of a process, of that interpret as a part of an apprenticeship. The interests that was produced by the notion of enclaves in the economic and sociological leadership that enclaves could be mobility machines for immigrant groups rather than traps lead to a number of studies that sought to to tests this idea or to put it to use. Two in particular synced most to this serve attention. The Russian, the Jewish enclave in the lower east side of Manhattan built by Russian Jewish immigrants at the turn of the century and the Japanese enclave that was created in Los Angels about the 1930s. Both, history tell us, serve as effective platforms for the economic incorporation of these immigrant groups leading by the third generation to levels of income and levels of education that were significantly higher than those for the native population as a whole and even for the native white population. All the earlier names are applied in the concept of ethnic entrepreneurial enclave tended to yield positive results, Min Zhou, for example, applied the concept to her ethnographic study of New York's China Town and found that employment in these in these enclave, the Chinese enclave have positive effect both for entrepreneurs in the form of high yield incomes and for employees in the form of opportunities for self employment. While workers could initially receive low wages and work longer hours, you know, because initially they were exploited this these advantages were compensated for on the job training and social ties, facilitating in time the acquisition of the wrong businesses in after some business years. However, since Zhou found that these advantages apply only to male workers as women remain confined to the role of supporting the entrepreneurial initiatives of their husbands and their sons. And a raid against these generally supporting findings a number of historical sources managed that question the benefit of ethnic entrepreneurship and even the very existence of ethnic enclaves. Serial economists took a very deep view of ethnic entrepreneurship and self-employment in general. George Borjas a Cuban American economist, for example, flatly asserted that though there is no evidence immigrant entrepreneurs are particularly successful, the presumption that many immigrants entrepreneurs begin with the small shops and through their ability and hard work accumulate substantial wealth is a myth. Similarly another Gregory Bates dismiss the privilege of self employment among immigrant groups with a comment that quote "It may reflect in part the language difficulties that restrict employment alternatives." Bates concluded that because of the very meager returns to entrepreneurship only immigrants who are not fluent in English will follow the entrepreneurial path. A common problem and this became a fairly abundant leadership both in sociology and economic and tends to attest the idea that was actually born here, in the city out of the experience of Cuban exile. A common problem in these leadership is the attempts to measure effects of enclave employment on economic output because the concept is difficult to personalize. In our own earlier work in the 1980s we defined the the enclave was defined as follows, "Firms that are located in a geographically circumscribed area with high concentration of co-ethnic enterprises." So if not isolated, they are located in an area of high concentration, the owners of those firms were defined enclave entrepreneurs and the workers in these firms were defined as enclave workers. The original formulation of the hypothesis was grounded on our own data that one ambiguously identified this to but as all the researchers tried to up to test the idea using census data, data well, you know not right for these purpose, a number of interesting things began to happen. I wont I won't walk you through the literature. It's resuming the paper but there is a lot but I will just give you an example that was probably one of the most problematic ways of indirectly measuring the concept with census data. Sanders and me in without me and Sanders like Sanders equated enclave participation with living in the area of co ethnic concentration that is people virtually live there. Residence, the problem is residence in this area may or may not work in enclave firms and the latter may employ or be owned by individuals who do not live in the area of ethnic concentration. We found later we could demonstrate later that most successful ethnic entrepreneurs in the Cuban enclave did not live in the area of where their firms were concentrated, probably live on as well. They moved to a suburb they have the money, they went to (indiscernible) so they actually conversely areas of high ethnic business concentration tend to be habited by low income workers and more recent immigrants. It is this residential difference that me and Sanders confused capturing their analysis and erroneously attributed them to the negative economic effects of enclave work which actually was because an enclave is not a place of a - you know, if not a place of habitation, it's a place of business. It's not a residential area; it's an economic phenomena as originally defined. Well, this hypothesis, the notion by mid-80s was grounded on the remarkable economic experience of Cuban Exiles in Miami in the 1960's and 1970's. Many escaped the Communist Revolution in Cuba with Leader Ali their shirts on their backs, few had property or capital in the United States and practically no one planned to stay here as they hoped for a prompt return to their country. The Bay of Pigs defeat in 1961 and the missile crisis episode the following year when the Kennedy administration traded the removal of Russian Missiles from Cuba in a change for a commitment to reign exile efforts towards throughout the Castro regime probably ineffective and to their hopes of return. Highly concentrated in Miami for historical reasons, that is as it's shown in the book. Miami was the place where the people who were not governing in Cuba came. And that is when they, the economic, their political faith changed then they went back, and those who were in Havana came here. So, it was already a political tradition dating through the 20th century that the this place will concentrate not in Tampa, not in New Orleans, not in Houston but here. That's that the book on that and the chapter explains why Miami but that's what happen at that time. So they the exiled Cubans who could not return pursuant, to build, re-build their lives here since many were entrepreneurs and professionals, they mobilize their skills along with their networks to launch what was the were then fledgling enterprises. Devices I asked that I identify in the book as the Character launch in which Cuban Bank Officers advance to clients without any collateral $20,000 or $30,000 in the 1960s and 70s to start their business. Based on their business reputation in the island, were very important. This is a form of social culture, the one that was used at that point to get these firms historic. And initially this firms located in areas of co-ethnic concentration what is known today as Little Havana have more, probably of more than one of only historical meaning at that at this time because most of the firms are fanned out of there, Hialeah. Cuba, known as a resource of this process, Cuba known firms grew nation wide from an estimating 919 in 1967 to about 36,000 in 1982 and 61,500 in 1987. Most were found in the Miami metropolitan area. The aggregate receipts of Hispanic firms in Miami in 1987, were $3.8 billion a figure that exceeded by $400 million that was second ranking in Los Angeles. And was three times that of New York despite the fact that Los Angeles and New York has been have much larger Hispanic populations than the than Miami. By 2001, the most recent figures we have there were over 125,000 Cuban owned firms in the United States with receipts of over $26.4 billion. The majority were concentrated in this area. Miami Fort Lauderdale there are 144 firms per 100,000 Cuban origin population. A rate that quadruples but among the Mexicans there largest Hispanic group sextruples, that among African-Americans, the largest domestic minority and exceeded by a significant margin in their rate among the native born population as a whole. The remarkable history of the Cuban economic and subsequent, because the subsequently political rights in South Florida have been told many times and in very different hues before. So celebratory, I know there is, (indiscernible) Shepherd, depends over, you are in this, this is a story that could be lamented or celebrated depending on what part of the political spectrum you are there, but factually it happened this way. Because it was enclave born out of this experience was then applied to other immigrant entrepreneurial concentrations, such as Chinatown in New York, Koreatown in Los Angeles, Little Saigon in Orange County, as well as large immigrant community, working class immigrant communities such as Mexicans in the Pilson area of Chicago. Numerous attempts to test this hypothesis, I mentioned before is often stretched the origin of conceptual definition that we have given to this concept beyond recognition. It therefore seems that is we- that is my colleagues and I have patiently endured these conceptual stretch of the original ideas and attempts to personalize in a way that we were not very happy with, it seems that after patiently enduring for about 20 years it was good to come back and revisit it, because if the hypothesis that concentrated a ethnic entrepreneur ethnic entrepreneurship provides a viable form of economical alteration for immigrant minorities, if this hypothesis holds it has to be among Cubans in Miami where this outcome should be most prominent and visible because this is where the the concept was born. Alternatively, if ethnic entrepreneurship and ethnic business concentration are mobility traps like some economists tell us then the economic profile of the group that this of a group that decisively opted for this route of adaptation should show this negative result most clearly. So we had a census in 2000 and we have a and we have public use data from that census in 2000 in which and therefore we can we can use that information to see what happens 20 years after the concept was formulated and all these discussion took place. Clinical attempts to apply the concept of enclaves to other immigrant groups aside from Cubans here have always being grounded on historical knowledge and direct observation of these communities. On the contrary mixed applications of the concepts and faulty conclusions have generally been based on secondary analysis of census data without any close familiarity with the groups - the immigrant groups that are still in and then usually the inferences are erroneous. For that reason an analysis of 2000 census data for Cubans in Miami must first of all take into account the evolution of this particular group in the interim period that is from 1980 to 2000. The defining event for Cubans during this period was Mariel. The decision of the Cuban government to open the Port of Mariel to all exiles wishing to take the relatives over the island trigger a massive and chaotic exercise as we know with over 125,000 new refugees arriving in less than six months. Mariel, we see now in retrospect after all these marked really a pivotal shift if what may be called most of the incorporation for Cubans arriving in the United States. So much so that of the 10 largest national contributors to American immigration, national groups, Cubans are the only ones that have experienced a significant shift in their modes of incorporation in this country. From highly positive at the beginning in terms of government and society to increasingly negative after after the Mariel. Its its prior 1980 exiles which included almost the entire revolutionary elite had been well received by the Federal government, were eligible for extensive, extensive resettlement assistance were perceived by the general public as a deserving group, US allies in the global struggle against communism. During Mariel and after that and after Mariel all of that changed. Cubans became - perceived nationwide as another third world impoverished minority seeking to crash the doors of the nation, the federal government focused it's efforts on stopping the in flow and treated new arrivals, new arrivals with much less benevolence than their predecessors. Following an accord with the Cuban government in 1994 all new Cuban refugees caught by the US coast guards in the sea are returned to Cuba. More important than these actions by the Federal government more important still is that the old middle class Cuban population of Miami largely severed their ties with their new arrivals. They were not part of old Cuba having being raised during the revolutionary period and most lack strong kinship and friendship ties with established Miami community. Perceiving the Mariel ethos and post Mariel entrance as responsible for the rapid decline of Cuban's public image in the United States which went to which went from being a well received group to become one of the most unpopular in national surveys of public opinion and having few social links with them pre-1980 exiles came to regard the newcomers as really a group different from themselves. The separation was geographical, physical as well as social. The old middle class Cuban population settled in the comfort of (indiscernible) of Coral Gables and Kendall. Mariel and post Mariel refugees crowded in the port city of Hialeah I mean, they are now deteriorating little Havana sector of Miami. These ruptured in most of the cooperation means that Mariel and post Mariel refugees benefited little from the social capital of the pre 1980 exiles. No character loans were available to them because nobody knew them; there were no no ties to establish, to prospective entrepreneurs with local bank officials. No tips for new business opportunities were available to them. While many eventually went to work for Cuban owned firms in Miami and so eventually learnt the ropes of self employment, their links to business owners and to the established Cuban Community at large were much weaker. This difference this in internal composition and evolution of the Cuban community must be taken into account and should be reflected in the data that is there is something that we know and should be reflected in the data. So let me present the findings, these come the files for the Miami metropolitan area consists over about 67000 adults aged 18 to 65 who earn more than $500 a year. The sample can be divided into ethnic categories as follows, non Hispanic white, non Hispanic black, Cuban older Hispanic and other. The last category, other, is formed primarily by first and second generation Asians, from Asia. The Cuban sample, in turn, is composed of over 12000 adults that can be further subdivided into pre-1980, that is pre Mariel arrivals, Mariel and later arrivals, post 1980 and the US born second generation which is there. This table begins to tell the story by presenting personal and family income of these ethnic categories. Non-Hispanic whites occupied the top of the economic hierarchy with incomes higher than anyone else. All other groups have average personal incomes that are significantly lower but of these only pre-1980 Cuban arrivals and the US born Cuban second generation have incomes that exceed the mean in the metropolitan area. In particular the only pre 1980 Cuba significantly sit 40000 in average personal income approaching the non-Hispanic white figure. The trend is the same when we consider family income. In this case only non Hispanic whites and the pre-1980 generations exceed $80000 a year in annual income with the Cuban second generation slightly below, slightly below that. This second generation group is composed, these are adults Cuban US born Cuban origin second generation, so these are for the most part persons who were born before 1980. So they could be age 20 by the time of the census and therefore they are the children of the early race, of the 1960 and the 1970. They are, in a sense, the beneficiaries, if there were benefits to enclave entrepreneurship of the (indiscernible) - these are the children, or for the most part these are not children of Mariel and post Mariel entrance with children of the earlier groups. By contrast refugees arriving during the Mariel exiles and afterwards have not succeeded economically. Their personal and family incomes are even lower than other Hispanic immigrants in the area and are not statistically different from from native African Americans. They they are here. This table, the next table disaggregates these figures further into the categories of self employed and wage earners among adult males, they are not sufficient number of self-employed females to permitting their ethnic comparisons of this scale. But that is for the most part ethnic entrepreneurship continues to be largely skewed in this direction. In any case self employed Cubans in Miami are almost by definition ethnic enclave entrepreneurs. Since I as I mentioned previously the original business networks of the enclave grew out of the city of Miami to encompass the entire metropolitan area and this is especially the case among pre-1980 exiles, founders of the original enclave and their children. By contrast Cubans waged and salaried workers may or may not be employed, employees of enclave enterprises. What we see there is that the same ethnic hierarchy holds with Non-Hispanic whites at the top. Pre-Mariel Cubans close behind followed by their children and everyone else way below. As repeatedly noted in prior studies entrepreneurs, the self-employed enjoy contrary to the argument of economists a substantial economic advantage in terms of personal and especially in terms of family incomes. Non-Hispanic Whites, and pre-Mariel Cuban entrepreneurs are the only groups in this area in 2000 to exceed incomes of a 100,000 a year with the difference between the two groups being just shy of $1000. The second they are followed at some distance by second generation Cubans and than others. Differences among wage and salaried worker followed a similar path, this is the wage and salary path. Well, with the Non-Hispanic White and pre-Mariel Cuban workers having above average incomes and no statistical difference between them, while other groups fall significantly behind. That result suggests that Cuban those Cuban workers who arrived at the time that the ethnic enclave have was developed have got rather well economical actually whether they are employed by these firms or not. They are here. That is that the only category that comes what the difference is a stark with economic performance of Mariel and post Mariel refugees whose income levels are at the bottom of the ladder for both the self employed and the wage earners. Noteworthy in particular is the dismal performance of Mariel and post Mariel entrepreneurs from this group whose economic rewards are the lowest of all the ethnic categories being surpassed by other Hispanics and being surpassed as well by African Americans. So for this group in a sense, ethnic entrepreneurship has not paid. It does not have the it does not have the faith that it has. And actually that is not because of lack of trying among Mariel and post Mariel entrants. This table I am sorry, this was this is also family incomes, I am sorry. I have the 100,000 figures were here. The earlier one was personal incomes. And we what I have describe described before is there. But the next table is interesting because it presents the rates of self-employment for all adult males in the Miami metropolitan area by ethnic category. And two trends are apparent in this results. First pre-Mariel Cubans are the typical entrepreneurial group with a rate that is significantly higher than anyone else including Non-Hispanic Whites. That result - the rates are 21, not very different from that of Hispanic or Non-Hispanic White. These are the two most entrepreneurial groups. But notice that the Mariels the Mariel population was not for lack of try, they were very close behind in an attempt to follow the same route as their predecessors. Mariel so they have been struggling trying to follow that route, that of that was charted by their by the pre-90 Cubans. But as we have seen however their efforts have not paid off. The outcome is largely attributable to this cut off social capital, to the end of the net works of the enclave, they were not part of the same population and therefore this entrepreneurship among more recent arrival not more recent arrived Cubans is a matter of survival, more than of capital accumulation. Despite these disadvantages I wanted to show you something about the end of it, but I wanted to show you another results of interest. Despite these advantages the existence of the Cuban enclave seems to have benefit workers of the same nationality regardless of their time of arrival. In one of the original formulation of the ideas, we argued that the existence of a dense network of co-ethnic enterprises would allow recent arrivals who did not speak English to make use of their human capital in a superior way that if they have to enter the main stream economy because entering the mainstream economy, without knowledge of English, confines you to, way to the bottom. That's the only worry that you that you could have. Whereas if enclave exists, more of that human capital brought from the country of origin could be brought to use either on language while they made the transition. So the hypothesis, the hypothesis would suggest that, workers that are that are part of an enclave would benefit it that way, at least doing better and so and so. The next table that I wanted to share with you presents the incomes of immigrants, immigrant that is foreign born, wage and salary workers in Miami Fort Lauderdale who did did not speak English well at the time of the 2000 census. So it is limited to those people who did not speak English or did not speak English well. The tables, these tables present data on personal and family incomes, for the male and for the total population. I am going to present first the male population and then the total population, and what do we see? We see that the data indicate the Cuban workers receiving come significances; Cuban workers who do not speak English receiving income significantly higher than other immigrants in the same situation. See in the data, also indicates that immigrants without English do not differ significantly across nationalities in all the dimensions of human capital. Their resource is strongly suggest that Cubans were better able to put to use whatever human capital they had brought from their country taking advantage of the existence of an enclave here. This is for the same which is personal and family incomes for all persons and as you can see, this story it is it's about the same. There are significant advantages in with on parts in regard to Hispanic, non-Hispanic immigrants and the same for personal income. So that part of the that part of the arguments seems to hold. Lastly, these average in their ethic differences that I have presented are just preliminary because they are subject to the objection that a well trained sociologist, political science or economist will immediately say that, "Hey, there are great differences in human capital among these" and unusually entrepreneurs how higher human capital, that's what economists always say. Which always - always prompt me to resolve if they, that is why would lead that people, - what would lead immigrants who have higher human capital to opt for entrepreneurial route. If those who are more okay, that decide to go that duration there should be something to it. But nevertheless the idea, the objection is these are gross figures not net figures in terms of controlling for this. So and so we need to take that into account. I am going to restrict the presentation to family income with a caveat that the regressions on personal income lead to the same results. So that it's just for for economy of presentation. Here, you have the regressions of family income on a ethnicity and selected variables for high, that have the this table has to be scrolled in two because it's too big. So basically the first one presents the effects of effects of ethnicity, on family income, of sex, gender, of work age as an indicator of work experience, I need to call out these terms, of education and self employment. In the first column, that is restricted that uses the entire Cuban population and does not disaggregate it, you can see that the effect of Cuban ethnicity is significant and highly negative relative to what? Relative to non-Hispanic voice which is in the reference category which is omitted from their regressions. So, if you if you concentrated it on this table, you would conclude that indeed enclave entrepreneurship has not paid off because they the effects are negative, not as negative as for other immigrant groups but is still significantly below the income levels of whites, net of the human capital function. That is, net of all the resources. Let's go through that human capital function, a second so that we pay attention to this as generally its known there is a net there is a net cost for females in the labor market that had been demonstrated time and again in every in every analysis of income data in the United States. Net of other variables, that is statistically equivalent females are significantly less as we have seen there. There you have also the positive effect of work experience as indicated by the effect of age and the declining positive effect of experience over time which is what the quadratic effect of a (indiscernible) and you can see there the enormous pay off of education. Colleagues these are the regressed earnings found out that on raw dollars for colleagues who want to debate that point or want to ask that we can take that in the Q&A period but I usually like raw dollars and not a lot dollars for reason that I can't explain, and one of the things for all the reason they had this the advantage that it shows what education is? Net of all the characteristics, ethnic origins, gender, work experience and some, a college degree yielded a net a net gain of about $80000 a year in this metropolitan area for adult workers and, I know, at some college $18000, a college degree $38000 and in post graduate degree $60000 a year. Now you want to you want to know why you are here enrolled in this university, there you have it. Its very clear that the face of education are powerful and growing overtime which is one of the reasons why income inequality is growing so fast in this country because if they the labor market is becoming thoroughly bifurcated among those with a high school education or less and those who have this kind of education and you can see it here. It's a powerful, powerful effect. But even after controlling for education look at the net effect of being self employed, contrary to what my friend Borjas would say and others it it repeats what we have found in the study after study. Controlling for everything entrepreneurship base. It yields a net increase in annual incomes over over $14000 controlling for everything else. So this is part of the story that is one. That in both cases you have that those adults who have taken entrepreneurial route usually do better even controlling for those things. But we have to go back and disaggregate then the Cuban sample to get the true story here. And what do we find that where as for Mariel for the for the Mariel and post Mariel Cubans there is a very, very significant disadvantage in terms of annual incomes available to native white. Its huge, its about two that is over 23000, for African Americans its even greater than for African Americans, its about 22000. For pre-1980 Cubans there is no disadvantage, there is no significant effect. At least they are on parity with the native white population controlling. For everything else it is not true, we have been able to determine, some people talk they argue going through the stream and argue that the enclave was really a CIA creation, that when the CIA staged move its biggest station outside of Langley to this campus back in the 1960s to keep preparation to their Bay of Pigs invasion, that they actually defunct a lot of people to that is they have to work they were they were doing and that was the capital from which this this firms emerged. That's not true, that the capital came from bank loans, from the character loans and so on. But there there was also capital funding from the small business administration that these proportionally favored favored Cubans at that time, there was the capital resources from the department of education that provided Cuban students with with loans in the same terms of a national defense loans and unique to other rules. In other words they were apparently of a of benefits revolving around the Cuban refugee centers especially after the Bay of Pigs reflecting the fact that the that the Kennedy administration felt increasingly felt they have to pay off for the failure of the of the invasion and these, of course, played a significant role. So I would not say it's either either or both, they were both. There were social cohesion and there were also resources resources and that cohesion carried on overtime. We that is we, 20 years later we are still seeing the results of that one. And on the other hand this is true because this was the pre-revolutionary bourgeoisie of the country, the upper and middle classes. It was overwhelmingly white and the fact that is not that is in the early stages of Mariel the question of race to what that is a question of the race of the arrivals was not so much of an issue. In a sense national solidarity triumphed race in the early stages. But the views of the country turn uniformly negative as you will seen that at least a minority of the Mariel exiles were common criminal, they have been taken out of there or were mental health patients. The entire communiquÃƒÆ’Ã†â€™Ãƒâ€šÃ‚Â© turn around and the fact that this was a much more heavily non-White population also played in the role of disengagement which exists up to today. That is clearly, I think, that it is that is the people who study these things, they will need that many that the Afro-Cubans have moved out of Miami precisely to escape this kind of double jeopardy or double inferiority vis-ÃƒÆ’Ã†â€™Ãƒâ€šÃ‚Â -vis not only the native white population but their own compatriots. And that so that except those who are big in sports or music and so on many much of this population is found in New York and the New Jersey suburbs than here. So that was also an aspect of this and certainly by what I have demonstrated here that predominantly Non-White segment of the Cuban population did not benefit from the net-worth's of the enclave and are mostly concentrated on the second population.