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So welcome to Panel Two, which is regional perspectives, and I will make my introductory remarks very brief and that is just to introduce Christopher Sigur, who is currently Project Coordinator in the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco's International Supervision and Analysis Section of the Banking Supervision and Regulation Department at the Federal Reserve here in San Francisco. I might add that he is the Senior Advisor to the Asia Society Office here in Northern California and he was a former President of the Japan Society from 1998 to 2006, when for two years I had the great privilege of working for him. Chris, the floor is yours. Thank you Bruce. It's great to be on, at a seminar when so many prepared remarks have been tossed out, because of recent events. And I think from what I have understood so far to be a very optimistic series of events. Certainly our speakers in the First Panel and Ambassador Lee's remarks laid a ground work for an optimistic consideration of what this Panel will be talking about, which is, of course, not simply the nuclear issue. But really, how it plays into North-East Asian security questions and how does how do the regional actors view the situation in East Asia from a security perspective. Naturally we will be talking a lot about North Korea. But I think, it will be interesting to get their perspectives on the entire security situation. Our speakers are detailed a bit more in your booklet, your program booklet, and we will, they will be speaking in the order in which they are seated here. Professor Kim Sang-Han is a Professor and Director-General of American Studies at the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security in Seoul. Mr. Hitoshi Tanaka was the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs and is now a Senior Fellow at the Japan Center for International Exchange. Mr. Xiyu Yang is a Korea-Chinese Diplomat, Former Director of the Department of Asian Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and is now at Stanford as a Pantech Fellow. Clearly an extraordinary panel of people who have been involved and engaged in exactly the issues we are talking about today from at the highest possible level. So I am looking forward to their remarks they have 10 minutes, each of them, because I do want to get to the questions, so please keep your remarks within those 10 minutes and we will be perfect. Mr. Kim. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Usually Americans start their speech with a joke while Koreans begin their speech with an apology. So I am Korean, I have to say, I have no joke prepared for this morning, but I have prepared a few statements about yesterday's agreement. Before doing this I have to say I really thank Asia Society for giving me this wonderful opportunity to speak to distinguished experts such as Dr. Perry and Dr. Hecker as well as Professor Scalapino. Let me say a few words about the meanings as well as the implications of yesterday's agreement. Ambassador Lee Tae-Sik made an excellent speech on an optimistic note, so I am trying to convey my messages on a rather in a cautious note. First of all one of the meanings and implications of yesterdays agreement is that we are now going through the first important step out of 4 stages, 4 steps toward nuclear dismantlement. Those 4 steps include freeze, first of all and declaration of all nuclear programs secondly, and verification as a third stage and finally we come up with nuclear dismantlement. So in that sense we are now beginning to go through the first important step and second implication is that the apparent change in the North Korean position does not necessarily mean Pyongyang is backing down or preparing to abandon its nuclear weapons. The nuclear program has always served as a pass towards negotiations. So nuclear program itself is a bargaining chip North Korea has little intention of truly abandoning at this moment. And the third implication is that the 6-party talks at this time raises a question about whether the US strategy, whether the US strategy has really changed. Before North Korea's nuclear test United States was using, so called dual sticks. One of which is a financial pressure and the other one is human rights pressure. United States, particularly the Bush administration, believed North Korea's so called regime security is located higher than national security. So United States believed, you know, it needed to put pressure on North Korea's regime security so that North Korea may be able to resolve it's own national security problem which happens to be the nuclear problem. But this strategy back-fired because North Korea anyway detonated it's nuclear device last October. Then the next question is whether the US strategy has really changed after the North Korean nuclear test or this is just a tactical change. That is a key question and finally the policy priority differences might emerge from now on between Seoul and Washington. North Korea in particular might use the so-called peace forum that is to be established as a separate dialogue mechanism apart from the 6-party talks as the venue in which it will demand a peace treaty with the United States to terminate the hostile policy from the United States this means that the establishment of a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula will be a precondition for North Korea's nuclear dismantlement. Although Beijing's mediation role has been important to date in dealing with North Korean nuclear problem Seoul and Washington's position will become very important from now on because specific discussions to realize the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula or the establishment of a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula will emerge. So in this light policy priorities could be somewhat different between Washington and Seoul even if they share a common goal of denuclearizing North Korea. Washington tends to believe the Iraq-US alliance should come first. Iraq-US alliance is the most important tool for resolving the North Korea nuclear problem. So only after the nuclear problem is resolved can we come up with the variety of conditions for establishing permanent peace regime on the Korean Peninsula. On the other hand, Seoul believes that the discussions as well as the actions for a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula maybe useful in resolving the nuclear problem. In this light Washington's policy priorities consists of Iraq-US alliance on the top, the North Korea and nuclear problem in the middle and the Korean peace regime at the bottom. But Seoul's policy priorities could be in the reverse order. So that's why Seoul and Washington should closely consult with each other from now on about how the issue of establishing a peace mechanism should be addressed. So in terms of scenarios, the future of scenarios of the North Korean nuclear problem, we can think of 3 scenarios. The first one is gradual improvement. Now you can think of very easily and the second scenario is a gradual deterioration. North Korea appears to be progressing in negotiations but clings to a foot dragging strategy in this scenario. So United States keeps a close eye on North Korea's actions and after weighing the fluid situations in Iraq as well as in Iran, United States could opt to mount pressure on North Korea within a limited scope rather than taking all out direct approach. Then the situation keeps declining while the options are being exhausted in the gradual manner. And the final scenario is the third scenario is this confrontation. The momentum of a dialogue in this scenario is lost due to North Korean refusal to forego its nukes and owing to its demands for the impossible such as calling on the United States to sign a peace treaty with North Korea. Pyongyang continues to harness a foot dragging strategy as it calls for the principle of simultaneous actions or the principle of a packaged settlement as counter proposals to Washington's road map for the resolution of a North Korean nuclear issue. However, United States sets a deadline for the resolution of the nuclear issue and launches an intensive pressure campaign against North Korea. Then we can end up with sort of a confrontation. So in conclusion our approach is right in the sense that carrots and sticks should go together to induce North Korea to make a strategic decision of denuclearization. But the worst outcome for the six party talks would be a worsening nuclear crisis and the perception that the United States was at fault. That is why the United States as well as other concerned parties should deal with North Korea's nuclear issue in the strategic but a cautious manner. Let me stop here, thank you very much. Thank you Professor Kim. Mr. Tanaka. Thank you Chris first of all I would like to appreciate the Asia Society for inviting me. I feel very nostalgic about being here because I was once a Consulate General in Consulate General of Japan serving in San Francisco, good old days, towards the end of 1990s and I am so pleased to see lots of familiar faces and also secretary Perry, with his staff, I worked to establish the Defense Corporation guidelines and those (indiscernible) maritime in the future and some extent related to the question of North Korea because Japan was lacking all the various kinds of necessities for preparing the contingencies and defense corporation guidelines were established in 1997, indeed paved the way for making the contingency planning possible relating to the North Korean question. I am also pleased to see the face of Ambassador Lee. He made an excellent remark in relation to the agreement we had the day before yesterday. He and I worked again in good old days together in the four month like (indiscernible). I am so pleased to see him, very active as an ambassador, Korean Ambassador in Washington. I would like to talk about basics. I would like to talk those basics out of my own experience because I negotiated with North Korea for about 2 years, the negotiation under the surface. My 25 weekends were taken by negotiating with North Koreans in various places outside North Korea. My wife used to complain a lot, because during the weekend those haven't I has been disappears for a secret negotiation with North Korea, very tough negotiation. But let me talk about basics through my experience, negotiation experience with North Korea. Our previous panelists talked about the fact that negotiating with North Korea maybe easier than selling to the domestic audiences. Indeed I negotiated for the Pyongyang declaration, negotiated for the Prime Minister's trip to North Korea and I got, we got the abductees, five abductees back to Japan. Kim Jong-il recognized the claim of abduction, apologized for it and we got five survivors back to Japan. I ended up with a time bomb in my house and a hardliner Mr. Abe ended up being a Prime Minister. So you must remember one thing, tougher approach is more popular than a softer approach. I think both in the United States and in Japan, the selling the agreement domestically would be very, very tough both in the United States and Japan. That's the basics number one. The basics number two, we must remember this. It was I think 1989 when we first got to know the nuclear ambition on the part of North Korea, almost 20 years have passed and we ended up with North Korea making a explosive explosion on nuclear devices last year. Why did we end up with this type of thing after 20 years? I think everybody knows that we did lack the consistency in our policies, and we also were not able to unite ourselves in the countries concerned in the region, in the unite - I mean United States, Japan, South Korea, China, Russia. We did lack the unity among ourselves. We should not, we should not commit the errors we had in the past. When we discussed the question with my dear friend, Ambassador Lee of Korea, we made lots of complaint about the U.S. policies, because the President Bush, Bush administration came in with a clear agenda that they don't like framework agreement. I am not criticizing the attitude on the part of the President Bush, but yet that type of inconsistency in terms of the policies toward North Korea, that's North Korea make advantage of. Therefore let us not forget one thing. Let us maintain consistency in our policy and let us have a unity among the countries concerned. That's point number two. Point number three. Someone talked about the difficulty in relation to the task we are pursuing, the dismantlement of nuclear weapon. Why? Because North Korea indeed developed nuclear capability for the sake of regime survival. Therefore most of the people speculate that it must be very difficult to get rid of nuclear weapon, because they pursued the survival of the regime. But to some extent North Korea knows that in order for them to be able to survive, they need external support as well. So there is a doom, there is a doom for diplomatic solution that we must not forget. And again our previous speaker talked about the question of nuclear deterrence. I tend to disagree to the sort of the fact that nuclear deterrence would apply to the question of North Korea. Nuclear deterrence does apply to a rational country meaning that, you know, if you use nuclear weapon you would receive a massive, a massive retaliation. But yet country like North Korea may decide to use nuclear devices for the sake of a kind of suicidal attempt like all those Middle East suicidal bombers and to that extent even those military operations on the part of Japan before the war. I think North Korea has a mentality of being a suicidal bomber. So I just wonder if a rational theory of nuclear deterrence could apply to North Korea or not. Again for Japan the nuclear weapon on the part of North Korea is a nightmare because Japan is the most vulnerable nation for the possible attack on the part of North Korea. That's point number three. It is difficult to resolve this question of nuclear weapon. But yet we should not, we should not forget about the need for us all, not just stop proliferation on the part of North Korea but to get rid of North Korean nuclear weapon. That is the basic point number four. Number five, again in order for us to be able to resolve the question of nuclear weapon on the part of North Korea; it is bound to be a comprehensive comprehensive arrangement. Ambassador Lee amply talked about 3 tracks which the recent agreement imply, the political track, the economic track and also nuclear track. The political track, normalization of the relationships between DPRK and United States and DPRK and Japan and also this peace forum as well. And economic track, the energy co-operation, the economic co-operation as an eventuality and he talked about nuclear track as well. The verified dismantlement of nuclear weapon. As long as this is going to be a diplomatic solution there would have to be give and takes and give and take cannot be done only on the nuclear front. It will have to be a comprehensive package in which we can make give and takes, so this you must remember. Any resolution if, by alone is to be a comprehensive resolution and we talk about this, DPRK-Japan normalization process in the context of political track which has been agreed upon in the recent agreement. When we negotiated with North Korea we established a process, process meaning that yes, North Korea must recognize this abduction. North Korea must recognize the need to resolve nuclear question or missile question in the multi-lateral discussions. And then we normalized our relationships. I forgot about the discussion about the abductees, for the abductees it is vital for Japan to have the right process so that we could find out a truth. You cannot get to those survive. You have to establish a right process in which Japan could get to know the truth about abductees. So that will have to be resolved before we establish our diplomatic relations with North Korea because we had promised to North Korea that upon the normalization of the relationship we would provide economic co-operation, substantive economic co-operation to them because that is to do with the settlement of the past. Japan colonized Korean peninsula for 36 years in the past. We need to deal with that issue as well, so in order for us to be able to deal with it we need to establish diplomatic relations and we provide the economic co-operation to them. You have to go through the Congress, you have to go through the Parliament to explain that we need to spend huge amount of resources for North Korea. In order for us to able to do it we need to resolve all those questions. That's point number five, you need to have the comprehensive resolution in order for us to be able to talk about the resolution of the issue we are talking about. Now the sixth element is that this is going to be a very, very painful process. I do not consider that the issue will be resolved overnight. We would have to be patient, there would be ups and downs, really because we do not trust North Korea and they don't trust us. Therefore every bit of action needs to be tested. Every action needs to be placed in a very severe watching mechanism. One of the elements which the framework agreement lacked was a precise watching mechanism. The six party talks used to have their work have the function of a very severe watching. That leads to my final point, that six party talks will become one of the very useful confidence building measures in East Asia. We have all the parties, relevant parties for the security in North East Asia. This co-operative security or the confidence building measures will be, I mean, six-party talks will become the right right mechanism in the longer run for a confidence building measures. Thank you very much. I would encourage all of you to write your questions down for our panelists on the cards that you have, the staff is coming by to pick those cards up and now I would like to turn to Mr. Yang. Thank you; first of all I should appreciate Asia Society for giving me this opportunity to express my views about the North Korean nuclear issue as well as North East Asian Regional Security Co-operation issues. And I would like to start from my quick comments on the latest documents passed in Beijing. And talking about the timing of the documents it remind me of my curious thinking, say is the number of 13 a lucky number or unlucky number? And I raised this question because when I was in the six-party talks I experienced 13 months break for the talks. But after this 13 months the long, long break and then we entered a very productive and the peace is likely, negotiations at the 4th round of six-party talks. But unfortunately we failed to deal, or we failed to reach a deal and all the delegates went back to their respected capitals. But 13 days after they came back and then we passed the joint statement, that is the arm, that was the 19th September, 2005. And this time another true 13 came to us. And after after another 13 months break the second session of the 5th round of the six-party talks reconvened Beijing, that led to the Berlin meeting and then led to the 3rd session of the six-party talks, succession of the fifth round of six-party talks and that produced this documents. On the date of the 13th so I hope we the peaceful process can meet on most thirteen's. As to the my feelings of the documents I read roughly about the documents and I have several points. Firstly this document is a starting point to create a new model for the summing a declare the nuclear stage back to a non nuclear stage and that is very important for the regime of non-proliferation. We are dealing with the North Korean nuclear issue, but also we are dealing with a challenge to the International Non-Proliferation Regime. If the Six Party talks have failed to deal with North Korea nuclear issue that will mean the failure of the International Non-Proliferation Regime. And we have had a lot of models for denuclearization, say, South African recent model South African model, Libya model and many Americans would like to talk about Libya model on North Korean case but I prefer arguing for North Korean model and I am very glad to see this document could be a starting point to create a new model that could be said now North Korea Nuclear Model, North Korean Model to denuclearize, declare a Nuclear State back to the Non-Nuclear State. And that will produce a profound influence in the history or record of the Non-Proliferation Regime. And then secondly this document may start the regularization of the Six Party talks. And it this is the first time for Six Party talks to name a definite date for the next round, and also name five working groups to work in varied issues in detail at working level. And that will create each a mechanism for the first time in the Six Party talk process. So if we can keep this momentum the mechanics of Six Party talks or regularization of Six Party talks can be created and then, the talk process can deal with the nuclear issue more effectively and quicker than before. But on other hand I have to say this document open more pending issues than it addressed than the issues they it addressed. What, I mean, is this document addresses the several key issues, but meanwhile open more controversial issues to be discussed, to be bargain for decision. For example at the initial stage, so how about the duration? How about the measures for verification? How about the sequent sequencing, actions? And that I shall say neither the joint statement in 2005 nor the latest documents have addressed or solved or cleared these questions. And in other words we need more negotiations, more business like discussions to address these pending questions. So in other words a more rocky road ahead facing the process of the Six Party talks. So basically I am quite concerned about the road ahead. So that is my feelings for the documents. But I shall say if we look at the process of Six Party talks, we should be optimistic. At the beginning stage of Six Party talks there was no discussion, no negotiation, just exchanges of oral attacks, the North Korea attack against the United States and the United States blame the North Korea. But gradually we enter the substantial discussions and gradually we got progress up to now. So I am confident that as long as we insist on the process of Six Party talks, we can address, we can solve all the difficult pending questions regarding to the denuclearization. We can reach the final goal of the denuclearization. And the the lastly what's the meaning of the Six Party talks? The regional security, cooperation in North East Asia, and I am confident that if the Six Party talks can solve the nuclear issue, that is very complicated on the Korean Peninsula then the Six Party talks will be able to evolve as a regional mechanism to deal with more regional security issues, like the nuclear crisis. And if we look at the five working groups, we can feel a possible structure, firstly, the five working group will create jointly a comprehensive resolution to the comprehensive resolution to the nuclear issue. And as well, secondly, the five working groups can evolve into a mechanism dealing with the other regional issues. Actually the North Korean nuclear issue is not a single security concerns facing this region. And I began my involvement in the North Korean nuclear issue in '94, since then I have seen a sort of a four year cycle of crisis on the Korean Peninsula. In 1994 we saw the first nuclear crisis and in '98 we saw the first the missile crisis and in 2002 the second nuclear crisis broke out and 2006 the second nuclear crisis plus the missile case occurred. So, why the crisis on the Korean peninsula repeatedly broke out? In my view, because of a two abnormal phenomenon. Number one, the state of war remain under the the Korean peninsula remain under the state of war, although the nuke, the armistice had been reached more than 50 years ago. And secondly, the Korean peninsula remain under the state of cold war, although the cold war as a whole had been over for more than a decade. So that means if we cannot terminate the state of war and the state of cold war on Korean peninsula, there is no way to completely solve the nuclear crisis, solve the nuclear issues. But on the other hand if we can terminate the two states, say, state of war and the state of cold war, then we can address the regional security issues. Actually the, many regional security issues have a close linkage with the issues on the Korean peninsula. So naturally the Six Party talks, I firmly believe can evolve in the regional mechanism. First of all, that process of Six Party talks can be a vehicle for the reduction of mutual suspicions. That is the most important issue facing the region. Thank you.