Sandstorm: Policy Failure in the Middle East featuring Leon Hadar with James Pinkerton and Geoffrey Kemp.
Leon Hadar talks about his book, "Sandstorm," at the Cato Institute in Washington, DC. In the book, Mr. Hadar argues that the U.S. should pursue "constructive disengagement" from the Middle East, where the costs of our involvement over the decades have outweighed the benefits. He says that Europe, Japan, and South Korea should pick-up the costs and responsibility of policing the region, since they are far more dependent on Middle East oil than the United States. James Pinkerton (Newsday, Fox News) and Geoffrey Kemp (Nixon Center) provide commentary. During the Q&A portion of the event, the panelists talk about the current conflict between Israel and Lebanon.
Leon T. Hadar
Leon T. Hadar is a research fellow in foreign policy studies, specializing in foreign policy, international trade, the Middle East, and South and East Asia. He is the former United Nations bureau chief for the Jerusalem Post and is currently the Washington correspondent for the Singapore Business Times.
His analyses on global affairs have appeared in many newspapers, including the New York Times, Washington Post, Los Angeles Times, Christian Science Monitor, and Philadelphia Inquirer, as well as in magazines such as Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, World Policy Journal, Current History, Middle East Journal, and Mediterranean Quarterly. The broadcast outlets CNN, Fox News, CBC, BBC and VOA have interviewed him.
In addition, Hadar has taught at American University and Mount Vernon College-where he served as director of international studies-at the Institute on East-West Security Studies in New York, and at the Center for International Development and Conflict Management at the University of Maryland, College Park.
Hadar is a graduate of Hebrew University in Jerusalem. He earned his MA degrees from the schools of journalism and international affairs and the Middle East Institute at Columbia University, and his Ph.D. in international relations is from American University.
Geoffrey Kemp is the Director of Regional Strategic Programs at the Nixon Center. He received his Ph.D. in political science at M.I.T. and his M.A. and B.A. degrees from Oxford University. He served in the White House during the first Reagan administration and was Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and Senior Director for Near East and South Asian Affairs on the National Security Council Staff.
Prior to his current position, he was a Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace where he was Director of the Middle East Arms Control Project. In the 1970s he worked in the Defense Department in the Policy Planning and Program Analysis and Evaluation Offices and made major contributions to studies on U.S. security policy and options for Southwest Asia. In 1976, while working for the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, he prepared a widely publicized report on U.S. Military Sales to Iran. His most recent publication is "Stopping the Iranian Bomb" which appeared in the Summer 2003 edition of The National Interest.
James Pinkerton worked in the White House under Presidents Ronald Reagan and George Bush. Since leaving government in 1993, he has been a columnist for Newsday; a contributor to the Fox News Channel
and a regular on its Newswatch show. He has also been a member of the board of contributors to USA Today and a Lecturer at the Graduate School of Political Management at The George Washington University. He is the author of the widely acclaimed book, What Comes Next: The End of Big Government and the New Paradigm Ahead (Hyperion, 1995). His writings have appeared in The New York Times, The Washington Post, The Wall Street Journal, Foreign Affairs, Fortune, The New Republic, National Review, and Slate, among other publications.
As a Fellow at the New America Foundation, Mr. Pinkerton will study what he describes as "the single most remarkable phenomenon of our time: the collapse of faith in the future." He will do so by examining America's waning interest in space and its exploration. Space may not be the final frontier for humanity, but in Pinkerton's view it should be the next frontier, as John F. Kennedy said. Yet it is a frontier we have been shying away from for more than three decades now. As a result, we have lost an opportunity for any number of political, economic, technological, environmental, and cultural breakthroughs.
Let me just say a few words about this book before I introduce Leon. I had the privilegeof reading an earlier draft of this manuscript and I was already familiar with Leon's workon U.S. policy in the Middle East going back to the early 1990's I had helped edit a paperthe Cato had published in August of 2003, which in some respects formed the col. ofwhat became Sandstorm. And you know, from the very beginning Leon has impressedme as knowledgeable and opinionated. There are a lot of knowledgeable and opinionatedpeople in this town, but he is also, which is equally important, an original thinker. And letsbe honest, because original thinking is really desperately needed right now against thisback drop of quagmire in Iraq, the f ighting in southern Lebanon, the nuclear crisis withIran and the moribund, I think that's the best I can say about it, the moribund Israeli-Palestinian peace process, it seems clear that U.S. policy in the Middle East has failed toadvance American national interest. In yet, even as the mystic of American power slipsby, by the day, too few people, I think, have kind of contemplated the ramifications of thisshift and come up with some new solutions. In Sandstorm, Leon surveys the historicalevolution of what he calls the U.S.-Middle East paradigm and concludes that its costshave outweighed its benefits. He argued instead for a policy for constructive engagementfor the Middle East, whereby the United States would transfer greater responsibility forsecurity in the area, to other global players, while encouraging the formation of regionalsecurity institutions. And I think, I'm happy to say it's an idea whose time might finallycome. I'll note a few of the several positive reviews of the book, including in the Journalof Middle East Policy, which praises Sandstorm for "pushing the reader outside the warnout language of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Middle East peace process, and theconventional terminology of foreign policy. His style compliments the boldness of hissuggestions and the strength of his argumentation in achieving his primary objectives,stimulating new thinking about the U.S. role in the Middle East". James Fallow, nationalcorrespondent for the Atlantic Monthly writes, "the United States needs a fundamentalreconsideration of its approach to the Persian Gulf and the Middle East and Sandstorm isa big help in this effort." The situation in the Middle East today is dire. It is extremelydifficult, even painful, to squarely and honestly discuss the U.S. role and even harder tocome up with creative solutions with what have so, for so long seemed intractable,intractable problems. And I want to congratulate Leon for tackling this controversial anddifficult subject and I really want to thank him sincerely for writing such a timely bookand it's an honor to introduce him today. Dr. Leon Hadar is a research fellow in foreignstudies at the CATO Research Institute, he's written on global politics and economics fora number of newspapers and magazines, including the New Work Times, the WashingtonPost, Los Angeles Times, Chicago Tribune, Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, World PolicyJournal, and the Journal of Middle East Policy. He's been interviewed by quite a numberof broadcasters including CNN, BBC, CBC and FOX News. He's also covered U.S.foreign policy and U.S. issues for a number of foreign newspapers including as the U.N.,United Nations correspondent for the Jerusalem Post. He's taught at a number ofacademic institutions, including American University and in addition t o his affiliation withCato, he's been affiliated with other think tanks such as the Institute on East-Westsecurity studies and New York at the Center for International Development and ConflictManagement at the University of Maryland. He's a graduate of Hebrew University inJerusalem and he earned his Master's degree from the school of Journalism andInternational Affairs at the Middle East Institute at Columbia University and he earnedhis PhD in International Relations from American University. In addition to Sandstorm,Leon is also the author of Quagmire: America in the Middle East, which was publishedby Cato in 1992. Please join me in welcoming Leon Hadar.Leon Hadar:Thank you Chris and thank you for coming. Timing in life is everything and someoneeven suggested that I (unidentified) the current crisis in the Middle East in order to get someboost for my book. And talk about bad timing, in 1992 the Cato Institutepublished my first book, the title was, get this, Quagmire: America in the Middle East. This waspublished, unfortunately, a year after the first Gulf War after the feat of George Bush thefirst, the start of the era of Bill Clinton and Bill Gates, you know, the end of history, thedawn of the age of globalization and the Internet and people were asking, you know,what quagmire and the Middle East, where is even the Middle East?Now the editor of Sandstorm cautioned me that its not very dignified to brag, I told youso, but since I recall the famous pundit in Washington who a few days or weeks beforethe U.S. attacked the Belgrade, the suggesting that the nations with McDonalds don'tattack other nations with McDonalds, I thought to myself you know, leave the dignity andI decided to quote from my first book in Sandstorm just read you a few, one or twoparagraphs and keep in consideration again that this was written in,it was published in 1992 and written in 1991."The successful military conclusion of the war against Iraq, created unrealisticexpectations that will (unidentified) by President Bush readily. The outcome of the GulfWar illustrates the policy dilemma that Washington faces in the Middle East that the Gulfemancipated by President Bush, President Bush the first, readily establishing democracyin the Middle East and making peace between Israelis and Arabs, only created theunfulfilled expectations that are bound to lead to new American commitments andentanglements. Americans who thought it was difficult to bring democracy and freemarkets to the former Soviet Union, that its strong (unidentified) to the west will discoverthat trying to implant those concepts, the Middle East system (unidentified) emerged fromthe Middle Ages is a long and almost impossible mission. (Unidentified) intellectuals inthe United States ," again this is in 1992, "insists that the global spread of democracy willalso produce an increasing pro-American sentiment. But that is not the case with theMiddle East. Americanism pervades the Arab and Muslim worlds and stems fromresentment Arab-Israeli alliance and the direct American intervention in the Middle Eastand the chances of making the Middle East safe in democracy along with Washington'spower to move the regions states in that direction are extremely limited. Washington willultimately begin to fill the regional political repercussions of the Gulf War."Again, I wrote in '91, "Middle East societies have always exhibited delayed reaction todomestic and regional crisis. The continuing socioeconomic problems in the world,coupled with growing hostility towards Washington because of its support for Israel andthe war against Iraq, could contribute to similar delayed reactions to the Gulf War. Wemight even see a resurgence of sodomism, combination of Arab radicalism and Islamicfundamentalism that might as well outlive Saddam himself. The United States and theconservative Arab regimes will then face a regional anti-American intifada that willthreaten American interest as well as spoil American interest."I also add two chapters in the book where I predicted that there are going to be growingtensions between Europe and the United States over the Middle East. Again, this waswritten, fourteen years ago after the first Gulf War and its not very surprising that after9/11 and also during the second Gulf War a lot of people send me emails and suggestedthat I should write a sequel, you know, "Quagmire II" and this is exactly what I haddone. I also should mention that each time we add the, one of those tipping points in Iraq,if you recall the toppling of Saddam Hussein's statue, the capturing of Saddam, thekilling of his sons, the first election, the purple finger, unfortunately, now they are givingus the other finger it seems. But in any case, after every tipping point it seems thatpeople would either, some of them hoped and some of them warned me that probablyproved to be wrong. But I think now against the backdrop of what Chris mentioned, ishappening in the Middle East, I think its very difficult for someone to argue that theUnited States is not descending into some sort of a quagmire in the Middle East.Now, I'm not auditioning for the psychic of the Middle East like one of those shows likethe Dead Zone, what I am trying to do is basically make a point that the actually thesis thatI stated in my earlier book, will sustain relevant today as they were fourteen years ago.What is my goal, is basically to reexamine and rethink U.S. policy in the Middle East,which was fashioned during the Cold War and which I call "The Middle East Paradigm."Now let me give you a short definition of what I call the "Middle East Paradigm". Thebeliefs and assumptions that have guided those making and analyzing U.S. policy in theMiddle East for most of the 20th century, you have to remember that in many respects,the Cold War started on the periphery of the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean,Turkey, Greece and Iran, after the United States replaced Britain as the great superpower and the Cold War actually ended on the periphery of the Middle East andAfghanistan. The Middle East was a major geo-economic and geo-strategic arena (unidentified) the Middle East.Now, let me summarize, when I talk about the Cold War, the "Middle East Paradigm", ifyou will, there are three components there. One is geo-strategy, which I think all of usare familiar with, the U.S. use, basically a strategy to contain the Soviet Union in theMiddle East. As I said, it will replace Great Britain and also France as the major Westernpower in the region, protecting Western interest in the region. The Soviet was clearly andaggressive, global power with an ideological disposition that was regarded as a(unidentified), very much like Nazi Germany during World War II, hence the willingnesson the part of the United States during the Cold War to pay the cost of maintaining astrong presence and commitment in the Middle East, the containment policy in the region.The other was geo-economic, that's the second component. Since the end of World WarII, the U.S. basically assumed the responsibility of protecting the free access of theWestern economy, including Western Europe, Japan and South Korea, to the energyresources in the Persian Gulf for very costly partnership with Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabiaand other Arab oil producing states. The Americans were basically willing to providethose nations, those economy, a free ride, you know, we'll protect, we are willingbasically, to serve as a protector of the axis to the oil sources in the region. And I thinkthat can only be explained in the context of the Cold War, since I mentioned severaltimes in my book, and we can come to that later, the U.S. is not dependent at all on oilresources from the Middle East. Its Europe, Japan and South Korea that are.Free idealism, this is the third component if you will. Israel. Israel was established in theaftermath of the European Holocaust and the U.S., the United States, American politicalelite and public decided that they were willing to provide Israel as a democratic Jewishstate in the Middle East with a certain margin of security visa a vie the Arab states. Andthis eventually, although it was based initially on idealistic arguments and also respondentto domestic political pressure, eventually intertwined with the Middle East paradigm, whichmade it, you know when you talk about the cost of Middle East policy, there wasthe need to juggle Europe commitment to Israel with U.S. commitment and support forthe Arab states, especially the Arab oil producing states.So when the United States was trying to make peace between the Israelis and the Arab,it wasn't so much that they were concerned over the fact that Jews were killing Arabsand vice versa, it was really to bring a certain balance into the Middle East paradigm, thatwe can support both Israel and both the Saudis.You can do that only by trying and achieving peace in the region.Now my argument is that the Middle East paradigm became almost the genetic makeup,if you will, policy makers, (unidentified) and law makers in Washington. It actuallyexplains the Pavlovian response in Washington, whenever someone says Middle Eastcrisis, you know, it immediately ignites those memories of, especially the 1973 war, thenotion that if you have a Middle East crisis, the Soviet Union is going to get involved,we'll have an oil embargo, Israel's security will be threatening, you know, those were theimages of 1973. And since then, every time there is a Middle East crisis, that's theimages that come to mind as far as policy makers in the region are concerned.Now, the main (unidentified) in my book is that the changing realities of the world and theMiddle East, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the changing relationship between theUnited States and Europe and the transformation of the Arab-Israeli conflict formingmajor international dispute into a more regional and local conflict, makes the "Middle Eastparadigm" obsolete in some ways. And I suggest that we reexamine those threecomponents of the Middle East paradigm.Look at the geo-strategic issue. The demise of the Soviet Union, clearly the mainrationale of the Middle East paradigm, suggests that, you know, in many respects, thereason any major political outside power that threatens Western interest in the MiddleEast. If anything, one can make the argument that U.S. intervention in the Middle Eastsince the end of the Cold War actually helped ignite anti-Americanism, terrorism, 9/11eventually, the Gulf War, and you have to ask yourself, why can't the balance of powerin the region be maintained for regional security arrangements as well, as I suggest in mybook, more commitment on the part of the Europeans?My argument is, if you look at the map and the statistics, the Middle East is for theEuropean, and the eastern Mediterranean states, what Mexico and Latin America is forthe United States. Its their strategic backyard. I mean if you're talking geographicproximity, economic ties, as well as demographic, this is their Mexico. And my questionis, you know, why shouldn't the Europeans begin paying some of the costs in terms ofprotecting their interests in the Middle East, which are immediate and urgent and arevery different from the United States. If Iraq, for example, if Iran, for example, developsa nuclear weapon, it will be able to attack Paris, it won't be able to attack Los Angeles.And you have the demographic issues that all of you are familiar.Again, the geo-economic issue. Since the economies of the E.U. as well as Japan, andnot the U.S., are dependent on oil resources from the Middle East, and especially sincethe Europeans have become, in some ways, in many ways, economic competitors of theUnited States, the question you have to ask yourself, why should the United Statescontinue to subsidize free security protection in the Middle East for the Europeans? Itdoesn't make sense to me. If you bring an end to free riding, and maybe if we do that, ifwe create incentives for them to do that, they'll spend less money on their wastefulwelfare programs and more money on the fence.Again, one of the points I make in my book, and I know it goes very much against theconventional wisdom, because people take it for granted that we are dependent on oil forthe Middle East. The fact is that America gets about 30% of its foreign energy sourcesfrom Latin America. You can make an argument that the United States is moredependent on Latin American oil, whatever that means, than on Middle Eastern oil.In fact one of the last figures I saw that Daniel Yergin in the Financial Times, he actuallyargues that 90% of America's crude supplies, if you take into consideration domesticproduction, do not originate in the Middle East. So the United States is not dependent onthe Middle East, if anything, the Europeans get most of their energy resources as well asJapan and maybe in the future, China, from the Middle East.Also, another conventional wisdom is that you know, that you know, the European andJapanese pay a lot for their gas. The United States supposedly, or American consumergets cheap and affordable oil. That is not the case. I mean if you go today to the pumpand you pay X dollars to fill your tank, the fact of the matter is that you have to factorinto that cost also the cost of several wars in the Middle East, 9/11, the Department ofHomeland Security, which means that actually you pay much more for the gas that youpay today than the actual price.Now idealism or what about Israel, which is always the question that comes up when Iraise this issue, well Israel today is the most powerful military force in the region it hasnuclear regions high tech economies in the world. It has peace with Egypt, Jordan andother Arab states. It has the military capability to deal with any perceived threat that youcould imagine, including any nuclear. One of the arguments that you can make in thesame way that we have a situation in which India and Pakistan are both nuclearweapons, they deter each other, its kind of a regional mutual destruction, I don't see whythat cannot happen in the Middle East if Iran and when Iran will have a nuclear weapon.Israel has a nuclear weapon, it can deter Iran and Iran can deter Israel and we have thesame situation that we have in South Asia.The main threat that Israel is facing today is not the lack of U.S. support, is thecontinuing control of the Palestinians, which threatens, I think in the long run, Israel'sdemographics, Israel as a Jewish or democratic state, which I think most Israelis todaylike to think. And that as far as we talk about Lebanon today, you know Israel, this is thethreat in Lebanon, it clearly doesn't need U.S. support to deal with that, it facesdilemmas, morals, strategic and other in terms of dealing with non-state guerilla threat,but it has no thing to do and it doesn't need again U.S. support.If anything, one of the arguments I make in my book, is that, to some extent, the U.S.ability to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, which is really a tribal conflict, a civil warin the holy land, if you will, it quite limited. The U.S. can act as a facilitator on some level,when both sides try to make peace, but the U.S. cannot deliver a peace agreement, asmany people think, in, between Israel and Palestine and if anything, as we saw in the last(unidentified) agreement, U.S. involvement tends to create high expectations and createseventually a backlash against the United States.Most of my book is devoted to discussing why the paradigm, the Middle East paradigmhas not changed after the Cold War. It remained in place, as I suggest and it created theconditions for 9/11 eventually, the Iraq war, I paraphrase what McArthur, what GeneralMcArthur once said about all of the generals, aging foreign policy paradigms do notsimply fade away. Now why didn't the paradigm die? You know there are manyreasons, inside the box factor, bureaucratic and congressional pressures, institutionalinertia, the most important factor has to do with the international system, the fact that theSoviet Union collapsed, we have the uni-polar system, there are no more check andbalances as far as the U.S. power is concerned. So you know, U.S. does what U.S. can,which means, you know, if they want to dominate the Middle East, then do it.The other side of the coin, and I think that many policy makers think that by controllingthe oil sources in the Middle East, the U.S. will have leverage over potential globalcompetitors like the E.U. and maybe China at one point. You know, we own the gasstation and you have to pay for it in diplomatic terms.Now from the first Gulf War to the second Gulf War there has been an effort to maintainU.S. hegemony. Under Bush the first and Clinton the first, I think what you had was onecan call a kind of cost free Pax Americana was a duel containment policy visa a vis Iranand Iraq. There were attempts to create the impression that the U.S. is doing somethingto resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. But eventually the hegemony ignited I think,back to 9/11, first to the second antifada and then to 9/11, demonstrating that if you wanthegemony, you have to pay for it. And I think that the debate today in Washington isreally between the Bush vision of democratic empire and those in the republican anddemocratic party that support what I call "empire light" that the U.S. can still maintain itshegemony for, you know, if we just cooperate with the allies, if we try to resolve theIsraeli-Palestinian conflict things are going to work like in the good 'oledays of Clinton and Bush the first.What I'm proposing is the new Middle East paradigm, the process of gradual,constructive disengagement from the Middle East. As I said, we'll create incentives forthe creation of new regional balance of powers system, make it more likely that the U.S.will play a more active role in the region. And by the way, I've just, as you've probablyread, that E.U. is actually now, I think is good news, will probably be willing to deploypeace keeping troops in Lebanon. And eventually, for the big picture, what I have in mindis the consumption of great power along the lines of the Congress of Vienna system, Icall it the Northern alliance, an alliance sort of between the United States, the E.U. andRussia which will really have two major challenges. One, to deal with the so calledinstability with the arc of instability, the Islamic arc of instability ranging from the Balkanto China, and two try to cooperate China and eventually India into this great power system.Now before I finish, I just want to make one more important point which I think is veryrelevant, which is the cost of maintaining hegemony in the Middle East goes beyondmilitary and economic resources. We have to remember that the collapse, since thecollapse of the Ottoman Empire, we really don't have a stable nation state system in the region.One of my main arguments is that the lack of legitimacy of political regimes in the MiddleEast is not a lack of democracy, not because of the lack of democracy, but because ofthe lack of a sense of national identity. Saddam Hussein was really a very good exampleof that. Using military power both internationally and domestically, in order to create asense of Iraqi national identity. So what you have in the Middle East today is basically notstable nation states, but a mish mesh of tribal, religious, ethnic, national and regionalplayers combining a shifting pattern of alliances.Now the story of (unidentified) and I think, I always like that metaphor, compare theMiddle East to a kaleidoscope. He said, outside is like the United States get involved andtry to tilt the kaleidoscope. He said just as we have tilted the kaleidoscope, the many tinypieces of color and glass all move to form a new configuration so any diplomatic initiativeor military intervention sets a new realignment of the player.This explains why (unidentified) intervention comes so costly. Unintended consequencesin the Middle East are not the exception, but is basically rule of the game. And the Iraqwar is an excellent example, I think we are witnessing what is happening now. TheUnited States devastates Iraq which was the counterbalance to Iran. It encouraged therise of the pro-Iranian Shiite regime for election in Baghdad. It encourages elections inLebanon which strengthened the power of Hezbollah. As the result of all of this, Iranemerges as the major power in the Persian Gulf and with its all ies (unidentified) to someextent Hamas decided to challenge the proxy of the United States, Israel.So, you know, now we have this new crisis, we have this new war, the kaleidoscope istilted and the United States is trying again to get involved and you know, resolve theconflict until the next conflict. And by the way, I think that one of the problems that weare going to face in the coming months, if Iraq will split into three mini states, it is possiblevery much that with Israel, the possible intervention of Turkey in Iraq, especially northernIraq, in order to prevent the Kurds from establishing or reasserting their power, especiallyover (unidentified).So basically outside powers have attempted to establish hegemony in the Middle East inthe past. I mean the best example is the Great Britain Empire. We saw that movie, itscalled the Lawrence of Arabia and many of the characters and the plot lines are similar,if you go back to that time, yo u know the (unidentified) trying to bring peace betweenJews and Arabs in the Holy Land, maintaining the unity of Iraq, that's an old story. Whatthe neo-cons, I think, try to do as far as this issue is concerned, is provide uh, a(unidentified) soundtrack if you will, to this movie, which is the democratic empire.As I suggested in my book, its as though Queen Victoria, the imperialist and WoodrowWilson who wanted to make the war for the sake of democracy, got married and had achild which is called democratic empire. It's a very ugly child and I think one of theproblems that you have when you deal with the democratic empire, is that I think thereasons, the major contradiction between the goals of an empire, which is achievinghegemony and order and then the goals of democracy, empowering the people, you wantto control with power to challenge you. I mean its like, if you saw the televisioncommercial, its like, the men who is sticking it to himself, you know, it doesn't make a lotof sense to me, and we saw that happening in Iraq.I mean if you saw the historical context, President Bush was responsible for probably thetwo most revolutionary events that have taken place in the Middle East since the IranianRevolution in 1979, which is the rise of the radical Shiite regime with ties to Iran inBaghdad, which I think is going to transform the Middle East in terms of relationshipbetween Shiites and Sunnis and so on. And the other is the election of the Hamas, alsoknown as the Muslim brotherhood in western Gaza, which is going to have a lot of effectalso, not only on the Israeli-Palestinian issue as (unidentified), but also the rest of theArab Sunni world.So, I think you see now, which is kind of ironic, I saw an article by Edward (unidentified)who was a journalist that suggested that maybe now we should bring (unidentified) backto Lebanon to establish order after we kicked him out of there to establish democracy inLebanon. And again, everyone is talking about how can we bring back into the picture? Iam beginning to worry that at some point people might ask maybe we should bringSaddam back to Iraq because of his power to stabilize the people in Iraq.Anyway, I'll be happy later to answer questions about more current developments.